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I. INTRODUCTION 
The maxim that in bankruptcy “equity is equality” routinely is invoked 
by courts and commentators.1  The goal of bankruptcy law, it is often said, 
is to treat creditors equally.  In fact, the maxim is not reflected in the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The Code recognizes numerous exceptions that allow 
deviations from equality of distribution from the estate.  In their debtor’s 
bankruptcy, creditors whose claims are secured by nonavoidable liens 
have priority over creditors with unsecured claims.2  Similarly, bankruptcy 
courts enforce contractual subordination agreements.3  The Code also 
gives certain unsecured claims, including tax claims, priority over other 
unsecured claims.4  In these instances, creditors are not treated equally.  In 
light of the many exceptions to equality, the more accurate (but less 
succinct) maxim is the reverse of the “equality is equity” maxim: 
bankruptcy law respects inequalities created under nonbankruptcy law and 
the Bankruptcy Code, and requires equality in distribution only when these 
inequalities are not present.  Inequality is equity in bankruptcy unless 
bankruptcy law requires equality. 
Decisional law in bankruptcy reorganizations recognizes further 
exceptions to the “equity is equality” maxim.  The critical vendor doctrine 
allows a vendor’s prepetition debt to be paid as a condition of supplying 
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 1.   See, e.g., Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13 (1924); see also ELIZABETH WARREN, ET 
AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 58 (7th ed. 2014).  For a recent article questioning the 
importance of this principle, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 
U. PA. L. REV. 699 (2018). 
 2.   11 U.S.C. §§ 725, 1129(b) (2012). 
 3.   Id. § 510. 
 4.   Id. § 507. 
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new goods or services to a reorganizing debtor.5  Under prescribed 
conditions, the terms of post-petition credit can include payment or the 
securing of prepetition debt.6  And in limited circumstances the bankruptcy 
estates of different debtors can be consolidated with the result that 
distributions to unsecured creditors of one of the debtors are diminished. 7  
These judicially created exceptions to equality operate in different 
circumstances and have their own doctrinal requirements.  However, they 
each allow certain creditors’ claims to receive more favorable treatment 
than other claims with the same legal character, and they may allow these 
claims to receive more favorable treatment than claims that would 
otherwise be entitled to priority over them. 
This paper concerns judicially approved deviations from equality in 
reorganizations.  In these instances, courts effectively have concluded that 
inequality is equitable.  Such deviations from equality raise at least two 
questions: how frequently do the deviations occur, and what is the implicit 
standard courts use in approving them?  Although commentators have 
noted the incidence of the deviations from equality, their frequency 
remains anecdotal and relatively undocumented.  We provide some new 
evidence to partially fill this gap. 
Although the standards invoked by courts in approving deviations 
vary by context, we show that the deviations reveal a common pattern.  A 
few courts flatly prohibit any deviation from bankruptcy’s priority rules 
absent the consent of the disfavored parties.8  However, many other courts, 
including the United States Supreme Court, allow some deviations as long 
as the disfavored parties are also made better off or at least no worse off.9  
These courts allow deviations only if they are Pareto improvements.10  
Still, other courts allow deviations as long as the favored creditors gain 
more than the disfavored creditors; 11 they approve a deviation as long as 
it is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement.12  Decisional law reflects a difference 
in the criteria that might be used to permit deviation from the Bankruptcy 
Code’s priority rules and its norm of equality. 
Part I describes bankruptcy priorities and judicially created exceptions 
to equality.  Part II supplies evidence of the frequency with which courts 
                                                          
 5.   See infra Section I.A. 
 6.   See infra Section I.B.E 
 7.   See infra Section I.C.  As explained below, one can conceive of substantive consolidation 
as a deviation from equality or as a form of inequitable equality.  See infra Section I.B.3. 
 8.   See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 9.   See infra Section III.A. 
 10.   Id. 
 11.   Id. 
 12.   Id. 
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approve deviations from equality in critical vendor orders.  Part III 
identifies the implicit standard courts tend to use in allowing deviations 
across a range of different exceptions to equality.  It discusses the 
normative considerations in play in the choice among the three possible 
standards: an absolute prohibition allowing deviations, a Kaldor-Hicks 
standard, and a Pareto standard.  This Part gives some reasons why most 
courts, in allowing deviations from equality, properly use a Pareto 
standard in preference to other possible standards. 
II. BANKRUPTCY’S STATUTORY AND NON-STATUTORY PRIORITIES 
A. Bankruptcy’s Standard Priority Rules 
In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the assets of the firm are sold and the 
proceeds are distributed to the creditors.  The trustee must first dispose of 
any property subject to liens such as those held by secured creditors.13  
Only if there is any money left over after satisfying these liens will other 
creditors receive anything.  Next, the Bankruptcy Code grants priority to 
certain unsecured creditors.14  The list of priority claims is long, but a few 
deserve special attention.  The Code grants priority to administrative 
expenses over general unsecured claims.15  These are usually claims 
incurred after the filing of the petition, but since 2005, the Code has 
granted administrative expense status to claims for goods received by the 
debtor within twenty days of the commencement of the case.16  The 
Bankruptcy Code also grants priority to a worker’s claim for unpaid 
prepetition wages and employee benefits as long as they are below some 
dollar limit (currently $12,850).17  Prepetition tax claims are a third 
important type of priority claim.18 
After the priority claims are paid, any remaining proceeds are used to 
pay: i) first, unsecured claims that were timely filed, ii) second, unsecured 
claims that were filed late, iii) third, claims for fines, penalties, forfeitures 
or punitive damages, and iv) fourth, payment of interest on the above.19  If 
there are any remaining proceeds, they are given to the debtor.20  If the 
                                                          
 13.   11 U.S.C. § 725 (2012). 
 14.   Id. §§ 507, 726. 
 15.   Id. 
 16.   See id. § 503(b)(9). 
 17.   Id. § 507(a)(4), (5); Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 8748 (Feb. 22, 2016). 
 18.   See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8). 
 19.   Id. § 726(a). 
 20.   Id. 
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proceeds are insufficient to pay any group in full, the members of the 
group share pro rata.21  Finally, the bankruptcy court can subordinate a 
claim, moving it lower in the priority waterfall, if the creditor agreed to 
this treatment prior to bankruptcy22 or if the court thinks that the creditor 
has engaged in inequitable conduct.23 
Chapter 11 is designed to end in a plan of reorganization that 
determines the rights received by the various creditors.  Claims are divided 
into classes based on their legal rights.  Claims with different legal rights 
(e.g. a secured and an unsecured claim) cannot be placed in the same class, 
but claims with similar legal rights (e.g. an unsecured bank loan and 
unpaid trade bills) are sometimes placed in different classes.24  Claims 
placed in the same class are entitled to equal treatment,25 but the Code 
allows unequal treatment of claims in different classes.26  Indeed, unequal 
treatment is sometimes required.27  Secured creditors routinely receive 
much more than unsecured creditors28 because they can insist on a promise 
of future payments with a present value equal to the lesser of the value of 
their collateral or the amount that they are owed.29  Classes of unsecured 
creditors can insist on “absolute priority” that ensures that they will be 
paid in full or that claims junior to them receive nothing.30  For example, 
subordinated unsecured creditors cannot receive anything in a plan of 
reorganization unless more senior claims are either paid in full or consent 
to different treatment. 
When two classes of claims enjoy equal priority, the Bankruptcy Code 
prohibits “unfair discrimination” between them.31  This language clearly 
                                                          
 21.   Id. § 726(b). 
 22.   Id. § 510(a). 
 23.   Id. § 510(c); see, e.g., In re Kreisler, 546 F.3d 863, 865–66 (7th Cir. 2008); Benjamin v. 
Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 699–700 (5th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).  
 24.   See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2012). 
 25.   See id. § 1123(a)(4). 
 26.   See, e.g., id. (negative implication of requirement that claims and interest in the same class 
receive the same treatment, unless they agree otherwise); id. § 1129(b) (nonconsensual plan 
confirmable only if it does not discriminate unfairly against class objecting to the plan); § 
1129(b)(2)(B) (nonconsensual plan fair and equitable with respect to unsecured claims only if these 
claims are paid in full or junior claims or interests receive nothing).   
 27.  See, e.g., id. § 507(a) (priority among unsecured claims); id. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (nonconsensual 
plan must pay unsecured claims in full or junior claims or interests receive nothing).  
 28.   See, e.g., Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 
Liquidation versus Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253 (2006) (finding that secured creditors 
received an average recovery of just over 90% while unsecured creditors received an average recovery 
of just over 50%). 
 29.   See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 30.   See id. § 1129(b)(2)(B). 
 31.   See id. § 1129(b)(1).  
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contemplates some difference in treatment, and courts sometimes allow 
one class to be paid in a different manner than another or recover at a 
higher rate.32  The justification is obvious if one class enjoys priority for 
one of the reasons discussed above, and sometimes courts will allow a 
higher recovery for administrative convenience.33  For example, courts 
will sometimes allow small claims to be paid in full in cash.34  More 
controversial are instances where the court allows a creditor a greater 
recovery because the creditor is contributing to the reorganization of the 
firm or because the greater recovery is “necessary” for a reorganization.35  
These justifications have much in common with the critical vendor 
doctrine discussed below, and we therefore postpone treatment of these 
doctrines.36 
The Bankruptcy Code allows creditors to consent to less favorable 
treatment, and in Chapter 11 this consent is usually class based.  That is, 
if a supermajority of the claims in a class approves the plan, the objecting 
creditors cannot raise an absolute priority or unfair discrimination 
objection.37  Individual creditors can object if they are not receiving at least 
as much as they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation,38 but this test is 
often not binding because the court thinks that a liquidation would yield 
very little value relative to the going concern value of the firm. 
                                                          
 32.  See, e.g., In re Kleigel Bros. Univeral Elec. Stage Lighting Co., 149 B.R. 306, 308–09 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that a higher distribution on union members’ wage claims did not 
unfairly discriminate in the face of a threat of strike when a union shop was needed for business to 
remain in industry); In re Perskin, 9 B.R. 626, 630–32 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) (finding that it was 
fair for plan to discriminate in favor of credit card debt when debtor needed access to cards to continue 
business); In re Ragsdale, 15 B.R. 668, 670–71 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (finding fair discrimination in 
favor of creditor with a claim partly secured by a car needed for debtor’s business); see also Richard 
M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy, 37 CAMPBELL 
L. REV. 25, 34–43 (2015) (explaining the taxonomy of fair discrimination cases).   
 33.   See, e.g., In re Cello Energy, LLC, Nos. 10-04877-MAM-11, 10-04931-MAM-11, 10-
04930-MAM-11, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1533, at *46–47 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Apr. 10, 2012); In re 
Storberg, 94 B.R. 144, 146 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988). 
 34.   See In re Hanish, LLC, 570 B.R. 4, 17 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2017) (citations omitted) (relying on 
legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 1122(b) for the proposition that the provision allows payment in full 
of separately classified small claims); In re Storberg, 94 B.R. at 146 n.2 (assuming that 11 U.S.C. § 
1122(b) separate classification of small claims allows for their special treatment); In re Jartran, 44 
B.R. 331, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (finding that 11 U.S.C. § 1122(b) allows creation of a 
convenience class of small claims receiving immediate payment). 
 35.   See Hynes & Walt, supra note 32, at 28 (quoting Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on 
Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 260 (1998)) (“[A] claim can fairly 
receive a higher return if the creditor holding the claim contributes to the reorginzation.”). 
 36.   See infra note 48, and the accompanying text. 
 37.   See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012) (requiring that a plan be fair and equitable with respect 
to and not discriminate against a class of claims that has not accepted the plan). 
 38.   See id. § 1129(a)(7). 
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As a final note, claims that enjoy priority status in Chapter 7 can 
demand special treatment in Chapter 11 as well.  For example, holders of 
administrative expense claims can demand to be paid in full and in cash as 
a condition of confirmation of a plan of reorganization.39 
B. Non-Statutory Departures from Standard Priority Rules 
In this section we describe three common departures from 
bankruptcy’s standard priority rules.  Part 1 discusses critical vendor 
orders, or the payment of prepetition debts of certain vendors to ensure 
that they continue delivering to the debtor.  Part 2 discusses roll-ups, or 
the prepetition payment of prepetition debts to induce a lender to provide 
post-petition financing.  Part 3 discusses substantive consolidation, or 
ignoring the legal separateness of the corporations that comprise a firm. 
1. Critical Vendor Orders 
One of the first steps that many debtors take on filing for bankruptcy 
is to file motions for “first day orders.”  These include an order allowing 
them to pay their workers and suppliers for work performed and goods or 
services supplied prepetition.40  Debtors argue that they need to pay the 
workers or morale would suffer and some would quit.  They also argue 
that they need to pay their “critical vendors” in full or these vendors cannot 
or will not continue delivering needed supplies. 
The Supreme Court recently blessed these critical vendor orders in 
dicta in a case, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp.,41 which dealt with a 
different issue.  The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Delaware had ordered a structured dismissal that distributed funds to 
unsecured creditors ahead of workers whose claims would have enjoyed 
priority in either a Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 11 reorganization.42  
It reasoned that because the distributions did not occur in a plan of 
reorganization, the standard priority rules did not apply. 43  The District 
                                                          
 39.   See id. § 1129(a)(9)(A).  Holders of wage claims can demand the same treatment if their 
class has rejected the plan.  Id.   
 40.   See Lynn P. Harrison & James V. Drew, First Day Orders: A Survey of Critical Vendor 
Motions and Recent Developments, in PLI Course Handbook 1, 2–3 (2009); John D. Ayer, Michael 
Bernstein & Jonathan Friedland, The Life Cycle of a Chapter 11 Debtor through the Debtor’s Eye’s: 
Part I, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20 (2003).  
 41.   137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). 
 42.   Id. at 978. 
 43.   Id. at 982. 
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Court of Delaware and the Third Circuit affirmed,44 but the Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that final distributions must comply with the standard 
priority rules unless the affected parties consent. 45 
In so doing, the Supreme Court contrasted final distributions, which 
must comply with the standard priority rules, with interim distributions 
such as wage and critical vendor orders and roll-ups.  The Court noted that 
“courts [that have approved interim orders] have usually found that the 
distributions at issue would ‘enable a successful reorganization and make 
even the disfavored creditors better off.’”46  Other language from the 
Seventh Circuit case quoted by the Supreme Court, In re Kmart Corp.,47 
applies a slightly weaker standard, requiring only that the disfavored 
creditors be “as well off.”48  As explained more thoroughly in Part III, this 
is a Pareto standard.  A reallocation is permissible if some are better off 
(the favored creditors) and none are worse off.49 
The court in Kmart did not actually approve a critical vendor order.  
In fact, it thought that orders that would qualify would be extremely rare.  
In Kmart, the Seventh Circuit ruled that a critical vendor order could not 
be issued without proof that a disfavored creditor would be as well off with 
a reorganization as with a liquidation, and that the critical vendor would 
not have made deliveries if its old debt were not paid.50  It thought that the 
latter test is unlikely to be met because i) many suppliers must deliver 
pursuant to an executory contract, ii) prepetition debts are sunk costs and 
                                                          
 44.   Id. 
 45.   Id. at 978 (“A distribution scheme ordered in connection with the dismissal of a Chapter 11 
case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic priority rules that apply 
under the primary mechanisms the Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business 
bankruptcies.”). 
 46.   Id. at 985 (citing In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
 47.   359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 48.   Id. at 873.  In applying a weaker standard, the Seventh Circuit drew an analogy to the unfair 
discrimination standard that applies both in Chapters 11 and 13.  Id. at 874. 
 49.   Interestingly, the bankruptcy court thought that its structured dismissal order also passed a 
Pareto test because it thought the skipped creditors would receive nothing in the absence of the 
structured dismissal.  “[T]he [bankruptcy] court predicted that without the settlement and dismissal, 
there was ‘no realistic prospect’ of a meaningful distribution for anyone other than the secured 
creditors.”  Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 982.  The funds to be distributed were to come from a settlement of a 
cause of action of the estate, and the defendant refused to settle unless the court agreed to the departure.  
Id. at 981–82.  As a result, the bankruptcy court did not think that the priority creditors would be 
harmed by the deviation from the standard priority rules.  Id.  The Supreme Court did not think that 
this was enough, arguing that it did not leave the disadvantaged creditors better off.  Id. at 986.  After 
the Court disapproved of the settlement, the debtor submitted a modified settlement plan which added 
$1 million to pay priority claims.  See In re Jevic Trucking Corp., Bankr. D. Del. February 22, 2018, 
1:08-bk-11006 (motion). The modification suggests (without proving) that the original settlement did 
not pass the Pareto test.   
 50.   Kmart, 359 F.3d at 872. 
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should be ignored by rational actors, and iii) debtors can use devices such 
as letters of credit to secure future performance.51  Other courts have added 
an additional requirement: that the debtor show that the vendor is indeed 
critical. 52  A vendor is critical when the debtor cannot get the goods or 
services from another supplier. 
2. Cross-Collateralization and Roll-Ups 
The debtor-in-possession often will want liquidity during a Chapter 11 
reorganization.  Creditors holding prepetition debt might be willing to 
make a postpetition loan on condition that both the loan and the prepetition 
debt is secured.  The collateral (which might consist of assets acquired by 
the debtor pre- or postpetition) secures not only the postpetition loans but 
also debt the debtor incurred prior to its bankruptcy.  This form of cross-
collateralization enables the lender to fully secure unsecured or 
undersecured prepetition debt it holds.  Under an alternative arrangement, 
a creditor holding undersecured or oversecured debt might condition its 
postpetition loan on the debtor using the loan proceeds to repay the 
prepetition debt.  In this way the prepetition debt is converted or “rolled 
up” into postpetition debt, which is secured or entitled to administrative 
expense priority (or both).53  A variant is a gradual or “creeping” roll-up.  
Here, prepetition debt is not repaid with the proceeds of the postpetition 
loan.  Instead, the debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) loan agreement provides 
that repayments of cash collateral are credited to prepetition debt while 
sums advanced are deemed postpetition loans.54  Under the agreement the 
advances are to be made as, and in the amount of, the repayments the 
debtor receives from its account debtors.  The amount of postpetition debt 
increases as the prepetition debt is repaid.  As postpetition loans, the 
advances are entitled to administrative expense priority or are secured (or 
both). 
Cross-collateralization and roll-ups, if authorized, both allow for 
deviations from Bankruptcy Code priority rules if the prepetition debt was 
not fully protected by an unavoidable security interest.  Prepetition 
                                                          
 51.   Id. at 872–73. 
 52.   See, e.g., In re Zenus is Jewelry, 378 B.R. 432, 433–34 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2007); In re Tropical 
Sportswear Int’l Corp., 320 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Just for Feet, 242 B.R. 821, 
825–26 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999). 
 53.   For a discussion of roll-ups, see Frederick Tung, Do Economic Conditions Drive DIP 
Lending? Evidence from the Financial Crisis (Bost. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 
16-38, Sept. 20, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2828295. 
 54.   See Paul H. Zumbro, DIP and Exit Financing Trends and Strategies in a Changing 
Marketplace, in RECENT TRENDS IN DEBTOR IN POSSESSION FINANCING 3, 12 (2016), 
https://www.cravath.com/files/uploads/Documents/Publications/3616890_1.PDF. 
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unsecured claims that are cross-collateralized are secured, thereby giving 
them priority over other prepetition unsecured claims.  Like a critical 
vendor payment, a roll-up allows the debtor to repay prepetition unsecured 
debt.  In this respect a roll-up is like a critical vendor payment.  The critical 
vendor payment allows the repayment of prepetition unsecured or 
undersecured debt as a condition of obtaining postpetition goods or 
services.  A roll-up allows repayment of the debt as a condition of 
obtaining postpetition financing.  Like a critical vendor payment, a roll-up 
effectively enables the preferred creditor’s claims to be treated more 
favorably than claims with the same legal character.  When authorized, 
cross-collateralization and roll-ups deviate from equality defined by the 
Code’s priority rules. 
Whether the Bankruptcy Code gives courts the authority to allow 
cross-collateralization and roll-ups is controversial.  Although the local 
rules of courts with active Chapter 11 dockets allow their use, with judicial 
oversight,55 their statutory basis is unclear.  No provision in the Code 
expressly authorizes these terms as part of DIP financing agreements.  At 
the same time, none expressly prohibits the terms either.  If the Code 
authorizes them, the likely statutory basis is in § 363 or § 364.  Some courts 
have found that § 364 does not authorize cross-collateralization.56  They 
therefore have inferred that the section prohibits the term.  The inference 
is unsound because § 364 says nothing about the permissible terms of a 
postpetition financing agreement.  The section merely authorizes the DIP 
to obtain postpetition credit and describes the circumstances under which 
it can be obtained permissibly.  An inference from § 363(b) might give 
statutory authority for cross-collateralization and roll-ups.  After all, the 
provision authorizes the trustee inter alia to “use” estate property outside 
the ordinary course of business, subject to court approval.  A use of estate 
property might be to collateralize prepetition debt (cross-collateralization) 
or pay that debt (roll-up) as part of a DIP agreement.  On the other hand, 
the proposed use of estate property under § 363 might be authorized 
implicitly only when the use does not disturb Code priorities.57  Cross-
                                                          
 55.   See Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R. 4001-2(a)(6), (7) (2017) (“material provisions”); Bankr. D. Del. R. 
4001-2(a)(i)(A), (E) (2009) (“provisions to be highlighted”). 
 56.   See, e.g., Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co.), 963 F.2d 1490, 1495 
(11th Cir. 1992) (noting that cross-collateralization is not authorized by 11 U.S.C. § 364); In re 
Willingham Invs., Inc., 203 B.R. 75, 78–79 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1996). 
 57.   Compare In re Saybrook, 963 F.2d at 1495 (stating that cross-collateralization is prohibited 
when it alters Bankruptcy Code priorities) with In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(allowing without deciding that 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) might authorize critical vendor orders even 
when altering Code priorities). 
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collateralization and roll-ups remain controversial in part because equally 
plausible but inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the section. 
If the Code authorizes cross-collateralization and roll-ups, a legal 
standard must regulate their use in DIP financing agreements.  In vetting 
financing agreements under § 364, courts have taken into account a range 
of considerations.  These include (1) whether the proposed financing is 
needed to preserve the estate and is in the interest of the debtor and its 
creditors, (2) whether the financing terms are reasonable in light of the 
circumstances of the debtor, and (3) whether the proposed financing was 
negotiated in good faith and at arm’s length.58  In relying on these 
considerations, courts defer to the debtor’s sound business judgment.59  
The second consideration listed is significant.  Financing terms that are in 
the interest of creditors (other than the DIP lender with prepetition claims) 
must benefit them or at least not make them worse off.  This is the same 
standard to which Judge Easterbrook subjects critical vendor payments: 
the requirement that the proposed payment to the critical vendor have a 
“prospect of benefit” to the remaining creditors.60 
The hard question in any particular case is whether cross-
collateralization or a roll-up is expected to benefit creditors other than the 
DIP lender.  Information necessary for a confident determination often is 
not available to bankruptcy courts called on to approve financing 
agreements with these terms.  This is a problem because the terms can 
have conflicting potential impacts on the creditors’ interests.  On the one 
hand, a DIP loan enables the debtor to continue in business rather than 
liquidating.  At the same time, financing terms that secure or give other 
priority to the DIP loan while collateralizing or paying off the lender’s 
prepetition debt can leave the DIP lender unaffected by the use to which 
the debtor puts the loan proceeds.  This can make the lender indifferent 
about the risks associated with the projects in which the debtor invests 
them.  The debtor’s continuation therefore might reduce the value of its 
assets and therefore decrease the distribution available to creditors.  Thus, 
the effective priority in distribution resulting from cross-collateralization 
or a roll-up might harm disfavored creditors.  On the other hand, a DIP 
loan enables the debtor to invest in projects potentially beneficial to its 
creditors.  A lender with preexisting lending relationships with the debtor 
                                                          
 58.   See In re Constar Int’l Holdings LLC, No. 13-13281, 2013 WL 6832276, at *8–9 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2013); Bland v. Farmworker Creditors, 308 B.R. 109, 113–14 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (mentioning 
the considerations). 
 59.   See In re Allied Sys. Holdings, Inc., No. 12-11564, 2013 WL 12301177, at *2–3 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2013); In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Curlew 
Valley Assocs., 14 B.R. 506, 511–14 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). 
 60.   In re Kmart, 359 F.3d at 874. 
2018 INEQUITY AND EQUITY OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 885 
might have private information about its prospects or otherwise be willing 
to lend on more favorable terms than other potential lenders.  Cross-
collateralization and roll-ups in turn can reduce debt servicing charges or 
be part of an otherwise favorably priced loan.  In these circumstances the 
terms of the DIP agreement serve creditors’ interests even when they give 
the DIP lender’s prepetition debt effective priority over creditors’ debt. 
3. Substantive Consolidation 
Many large firms partition their assets among legally separate entities, 
granting some creditors structural priority over others.61  If a corporate 
parent puts some of its assets in one of its subsidiaries, creditors who lend 
to the subsidiary get paid from the subsidiary’s assets before creditors of 
the other affiliates get paid from them.  Partitioning assets in different 
affiliates therefore in effect gives creditors of the subsidiary priority over 
creditors of the other affiliates.  For example, assume that Bank lends $10 
to Parent and Finance lends $5 to Subsidiary.  In addition to owning all of 
the stock of Subsidiary, Parent has assets with a value of $5, and 
Subsidiary’s assets are valued at $8.  If both debtors default and their assets 
are liquidated, Finance receives $5 from Subsidiary’s assets.  Bank 
receives $3 ($8 - $5), the remaining value of Subsidiary’s assets after 
Finance’s claim is satisfied from them.  Finance therefore is paid in full 
while Bank’s total recovery is $8 ($3 from Subsidiary’s assets plus $5 
from Parent’s assets). 
Under prescribed conditions, bankruptcy law allows the assets of 
legally separate debtors to be consolidated.  The doctrine of substantive 
consolidation, when applicable, combines the assets of the debtors and 
cancels any liabilities the debtors have to each other.  Creditors’ claims 
against the separate debtors are treated as claims against the consolidated 
estate and satisfied from it.  Substantive consolidation can enhance the 
distribution of certain creditors at the expense of other creditors.  In 
general, substantive consolidation enhances the recovery of the unsecured 
claims of the more insolvent consolidated debtor and diminishes the 
recovery of the unsecured claims of the less insolvent debtor.  For 
example, assume that Debtor A has assets of $50 and unsecured liabilities 
of $100 while Debtor B has assets of $20 and unsecured liabilities of $100.  
Without consolidation, A’s creditors receive a 50% distribution from A’s 
                                                          
 61.  See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 9–10 (2d ed. 2009) (describing role of asset partitioning among legally 
separate entities in enabling pledge of assets just to creditors of each entity); DOUGLAS BAIRD, 
ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 253–54 (6th ed. 2014) (illustrating structural priority involving a 
corporate conglomerate).   
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estate and B’s creditors receive a 20% distribution from B’s estate.  If A’s 
and B’s assets are substantively consolidated, A’s and B’s creditors each 
receive a 35% distribution from the consolidated assets. 
We view substantive consolidation as a deviation from equality.  A 
simple definition of equality suggests precisely the opposite, because 
substantive consolidation results in each creditor receiving the same 
ratable distribution.  To the extent this is true, however, it is an inequitable 
equality because creditors whose claims against their debtor were entitled 
to a pro rata distribution from a legally separate set of assets instead 
receive a pro rata distribution based on all of the claims against the 
consolidated debtors from the consolidated debtors’ assets.  Thus, 
consolidation enables creditors in the same class to receive more or less 
than they would receive from their respective debtor’s estate.  This 
deviation from the ordinary priority rules is an inequality if the relevant 
standard is “to each according to her distribution from her debtor’s assets.”  
In the previous example involving Bank and Finance, without substantive 
consolidation, Finance is the sole creditor of Subsidiary and is paid in full 
($5).  Bank, whose claim is not paid in full, is entitled to a distribution 
from Subsidiary’s assets only after Finance’s claim has been satisfied from 
them.  Bank’s total distribution, as before, is $8.  By comparison, where 
Parent and Subsidiary’s assets are substantively consolidated, Finance’s 
pro rata distribution does not pay it in full ($5/$15 x $13 = $4.29).  Bank’s 
distribution is $8.58 ($10/$15 x $13).  From the baseline of a distribution 
from their respective debtors’ assets, Finance and Bank are treated 
unequally.62 
The statutory authority for substantive consolidation is elusive.  No 
Bankruptcy Code provision directly authorizes the practice,63 and none 
appears malleable enough to implicitly support it.  Nonetheless, the 
                                                          
 62.   The choice of operative notion of equality is contestable.  However, bankruptcy law does 
not guarantee creditors an equal distribution in satisfaction of their claims.  On the notion of equality 
as equal ratable distribution, substantive consolidation allows courts to ignore the legal separateness 
of debtors and enforce an equal ratable distribution in bankruptcy.  Cf. Chem. Bank N.Y. Tr. Co. v. 
Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 848 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J., concurring) (stating that equity allows 
consolidation).  Courts commonly recite that substantive consolidation is an unusual equitable remedy 
to be used “sparingly.”  See Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 767 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Kheel, 369 F.2d at 847.  This acknowledgment implicitly recognizes that, where equity does not allow 
consolidation, bankruptcy law might mandate an unequal distribution to creditors of different debtors.  
 63.   Neither 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) nor the inherent jurisdiction of the bankruptcy (or district) court 
ground the power to substantively consolidate separate debtor’s estates.  The closest authority is 11 
U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C).  However, a straightforward reading of that provision does not provide a basis 
to consolidate separate estates.  By its terms, the provision permits a plan as implemented to include 
consolidation.  Thus, § 1123(a)(5)(C) allows the plan to call for the merger of the reorganized debtor.  
The provision does not say or imply that the rights of creditors can be compromised by such a 
consolidation.  
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practice is well entrenched in case law.  Courts divide over the standard 
under which the assets and liabilities of legally distinct debtors can be 
consolidated.  Although some courts are unclear about the basis on which 
they rely,64 the case law reveals two competing standards.  The 
predominant standard requires that either of two conditions be met: (1) that 
the distinct debtors disregarded their separate identities so that creditors 
dealt with them as a single economic unit and did not rely on their separate 
identities, or (2) that the separate debtors’ financial affairs have become 
so entangled that consolidation benefits all unsecured creditors.65  A 
minority of courts rely on a standard that permits substantive consolidation 
if (1) there is a substantial financial identity between the entities to be 
consolidated and (2) consolidation is needed to avoid some harm or realize 
some benefit to creditors.66  If the proponent shows both of these things, 
the burden of proof shifts to the opponent of consolidation.  It must 
demonstrate that it relied on the separate credit of one of the entities and 
that it will be harmed by consolidation.67  Even if the disfavored creditor 
makes this showing, the court may still approve the substantive 
consolidation if “the demonstrated benefits of consolidation ‘heavily’ 
outweigh the harm.”68 
The two competing standards are significantly different.  The second 
part of the majority disjunctive standard allows consolidation only when 
it improves the position of every creditor or at least does not leave any 
worse off—a Pareto improvement.  By contrast, the minority’s standard 
requires only that consolidation avoid some harm or produce some benefit 
for the creditors.  Importantly, it does not require that consolidation benefit 
every creditor.69  Thus, the standard allows consolidation when, although 
harming some creditors, results in a net benefit for creditors as a whole.  
For example, the D.C Circuit would allow substantive consolidation as 
long as “the demonstrated benefits of consolidation ‘heavily’ outweigh the 
harm.”70  This is a Kaldor-Hicks test. 
                                                          
 64.   See, e.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 207 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that most courts 
“slipstreamed” behind different rationales). 
 65.   See id. at 208–09; United Savs. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo 
Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 66.   See Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Assoc., 935 F.2d 245, 249 (11th Cir. 1991); Drabkin v. 
Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 67.   See Eastgroup Props., 935 F.2d at 249; In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d at 276.  
 68.   Eastgroup Props., 935 F.2d at 249 (citation omitted). 
 69.   Some courts have been fairly liberal in finding a benefit from consolidation.  See, e.g., In re 
Owens Corning, 305 B.R. at 181–82. 
 70.   In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d at 276 (citation omitted). 
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III. HOW FREQUENT ARE PRIORITY DEVIATIONS? 
A number of commentators have suggested that critical vendor orders, 
roll-ups and substantive consolidation are quite common.  The literature 
offers at least some limited evidence on their frequency.  Tung presents 
the most recent and most thorough study of roll-ups.  He studies all firms 
that filed for bankruptcy between 2012 and 2014, had their bankruptcy 
resolved by 2013, and are listed in Lynne LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research 
Database.71  He found that 62% of the cases had DIP financing and that of 
these more than half (54%) had a roll-up.72  Although roll-ups sometimes 
are classified as “extraordinary provisions” and justified by arguing that 
the debtor would not otherwise be able to get credit, Tung fails to find a 
statistically significant relationship between roll-ups and economic 
conditions.73  William Widen also used LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research 
Database to study substantive consolidation.74  He found that that more 
than half (56.5%) of the firms in this database that filed between 2000 and 
2005 had some form of substantive consolidation.75  While the Tung and 
Widen studies are impressive, they look at a fairly narrow set of cases.  To 
be included in LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database, a firm must be 
publicly traded and have assets of at least $100 million in 1980 dollars, 
about $300 million in 2017 dollars.76  These bankruptcies account for a 
very small share of Chapter 11 filings.  The Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts reports 7,241 Chapter 11 filings in 2015, but LoPucki’s 
database lists just 25 firms for that year.77  Nonetheless, we understand the 
                                                          
 71.   See Tung, supra note 53, at 15. 
 72.   Id. at 15, 26. 
 73.   Id. at 2. 
 74.   See generally William H. Widen, Report to the American Bankruptcy Institute: Prevalence 
of Substantive Consolidation in Large Public Company Bankruptcies from 2000 to 2005, 16 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (2008) (using the LoPucki database in a study of substantive consolidation in 
large public bankruptcy filings). 
 75.   Id. at 5. 
 76.   $100 million in June of 1980 is $296 million in June of 2017.  UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy 
Research Database, UCLA SCH. L., http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/ (last visitied March 14, 2018); see 
also CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/data/ 
inflation_calculator.htm (last visited March 14, 2018). 
 77.   Table F-2—Bankr. Filing, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/table 
_f-_2_yearly_dec_2015_0.pdf (Dec. 31, 2015); UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, 
supra note 76.  Nearly all of these firms had multiple subsidiaries that filed their own bankruptcy 
petitions and thus were counted as separate cases by the Administrative Office.  As a result, the public 
firms would account for many more than 25 cases out of 7,241.  For a discussion of firms and cases, 
see infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 
2018 INEQUITY AND EQUITY OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 889 
need to study large dollar bankruptcies.  To paraphrase Willie Sutton, that 
is where the money is.78 
Our search of the literature found allegations that courts routinely 
approve critical vendor orders paying little attention to the standards set 
forth in Kmart,79 and that the approval of these orders is becoming 
increasingly common.80  With one exception, the academics making these 
allegations present no data to support these claims.  The exception is a 
recent study of sixty-three large Chapter 11 cases filed in 2013.81  The 
study found that critical vendor orders were filed and approved in 
approximately 75% of the cases.82  Unfortunately, it is unclear what 
general lessons one can draw from these cases because the study provides 
few details as to how the sample was constructed.  Unlike LoPucki’s 
sample that has clear criteria for inclusion, the study of sixty-three Chapter 
11 cases tells us only that the data was provided by “leading claims agents 
in large Chapter 11 cases.”83  Moreover, the cases selected were almost 
certainly not a random sample of the cases handled by these firms because 
it included the ten largest bankruptcies from that year,84 and the study does 
not tell us whether the sample represents the full population of cases 
handled by these firms.  Finally, the source of the data suggests that the 
study did not sample small firm bankruptcy reorganizations. 
Although we do not provide a thorough empirical study of critical 
vendor orders, the suggestive evidence we present begins to fill an 
important gap in the literature and suggests four tentative conclusions.  
First, critical vendor orders do occur, but they are by no means universal.  
The majority of firms in Chapter 11 do not appear to pay prepetition 
creditors prior to plan confirmation or liquidation.  Second, size matters: 
critical vendor orders are much more common in the reorganization of 
                                                          
 78.   Leonard Buder, Willie Sutton Said It First: ‘That’s Where the Money Is,’ N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1979/08/26/archives/willie-sutton-said-it-first-thats-where-the-money-
is.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).  Willie Sutton is alleged to have explained that he robbed banks 
“because that’s where the money is.”  Id. 
 79.   See, e.g., Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking 
Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1257 (2013) (“In practice, few lower courts 
expend much energy making the judgments that the Seventh Circuit thought appropriate. Debtors ask 
that the old vendors be paid and courts approve those requests.”); Skeel, supra note 1, at 717 
(“Bankruptcy judges rarely require a debtor to present any meaningful evidence that a supplier truly 
is irreplaceable and would cease doing business with the debtor unless it is paid in full.”). 
 80.   Skeel, supra note 1, at 717 (“Critical vendor treatment traditionally was viewed as a limited 
exception to the equality of creditors norm, but its use is now commonplace in large cases.”). 
 81.   See Elizabeth Shumejda, Critical Vendor Trade Agreements in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 24 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 159, 160 (2016). 
 82.   See id.  
 83.   Id. at 171. 
 84.   Id. at 220 n. 54. 
 
890 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
larger firms than in smaller firms.  Third, many critical vendor orders 
authorize payments to creditors who are likely to otherwise enjoy priority 
over general creditors.  Fourth, we fail to find a discernable increase in 
these orders between 2008 and 2015. 
With our research assistants, we began by reading the dockets of two 
(admittedly small) samples of cases to identify the language courts used 
for critical vendor orders.  First, we looked at cases in LoPucki’s 
Bankruptcy Research Database that filed in 2015.  We chose to look at 
cases filed in 2015 because these cases are recent but still have had 
sufficient time for critical vendor motions to occur.  Because there were 
just twenty-five of these cases, we had a research assistant examine every 
one.  In addition, we had a research assistant examine a random sample of 
thirty corporate Chapter 11 cases filed in either 2010 or 2013 in 
jurisdictions that account for about 93% of all Chapter 11 filings in the 
United States.85  Because we are interested in the percentage of bankrupt 
“firms” that have critical vendor orders, we dropped a case if it was 
consolidated with another case.86 
Both searches faced the same definitional problem of what precisely 
we mean by a critical vendor order.  One can plausibly argue that payments 
to creditors that enjoy priority are different than payments to general 
unsecured creditors.  As noted above, vendors who delivered goods within 
the ordinary course of business are given administrative expense status 
under § 503(b)(9), some taxes are given priority over general claims,87 and 
workers claims for unpaid wages and employee benefits are given priority 
as long as they are below some dollar amounts.88  Other creditors, such as 
shippers and warehousemen, sometimes can assert liens on the debtor’s 
goods in their possession.89  To the extent that these creditors would be 
entitled to priority over general creditors in a liquidation or reorganization, 
general unsecured creditors have less reason to object to their early 
repayment.  On the other hand, these provisions give the creditors priority 
at the end of a case, not a right to immediate payment.  Moreover, it is not 
always so clear whether the creditors actually enjoy priority.  For example, 
a shipper may have a plausible claim to a lien, but this lien could be 
subordinate to a priority lien of a secured creditor and fully underwater.  
                                                          
 85.   See Richard M. Hynes, Anne Lawton & Margaret Howard, National Study of Individual 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 61, 69 n. 40 (2017) (listing the few 
jurisdictions that were excluded from the study).  
 86.   Failing to do so would overweight firms with many subsidiaries.  For example, if firm A has 
a parent and nine subsidiaries and firm B has just a single corporation, coding the lead case would 
give firm A ten times the odds of inclusion as firm B. 
 87.   See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2012). 
 88.   See id. § 507(a)(4),(5). 
 89.   See U.C.C. § 7-209 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003). 
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Similarly, the claims of some workers may exceed the dollar limits, and 
general creditors could argue that some goods were not delivered in the 
ordinary course of business.  It can be controversial whether a payment to 
priority creditor should count as a critical vendor payment and unclear 
whether a critical vendor payment is a priority payment or a payment to a 
general creditor. 
Because of this uncertainty, we considered two measures.  Our 
“broad” measure includes any identifiable repayment of a pre-petition 
claim.  Our “narrow” measure excludes payments of claims that have some 
plausible claim to priority, such as employee claims for wages and 
employee benefits, claims for unpaid taxes, claims designated as § 
503(b)(9) claims, claims of shippers and warehousemen, and claims where 
there is a plausible argument for a constructive trust.  We assessed the 
priority of the claims based solely on the information on the docket itself. 
Regardless of how we measured critical vendor orders, they were 
much more common in the larger bankruptcies in the LoPucki’s 
Bankruptcy Research Database.  Twenty-three of the twenty-five publicly 
traded firms (92%) had a broadly defined critical vendor order; the only 
two for which we could not find a payment of a pre-petition debt were 
involuntary filings.  If we limit our definition of a critical vendor order to 
payments of claims without some assertion of priority, this rate falls to 
fourteen out of twenty-five firms (56%), as a few firms paid wages and 
other employee obligations and many of the energy firms asserted that the 
paid claims would have enjoyed some form of priority.  These figures were 
much higher than those we found in the random sample of Chapter 11 
cases.  Of the thirty randomly selected Chapter 11 bankruptcies filed in 
2010 or 2013, 16.7% had a broadly defined critical vendor order and only 
two (6.7%) had a narrowly defined critical vendor order. 
Unfortunately, neither sample is entirely satisfactory.  The random 
sample should be fairly representative of Chapter 11 cases.  However, 
because small firm filings constitute most of the Chapter 11 cases filed, 
the sample is dominated by smaller cases.  Only half of the Chapter 11 
cases in our random sample had more than a million dollars in liabilities 
and just 40% had more than a million dollars in assets.  The LoPucki 
sample presents the opposite problem.  It focuses on the most massive 
bankruptcies, but comprises a small share of all Chapter 11 filings.  We 
mitigated these problems by searching all dockets on Bloomberg Law for 
Chapter 11 cases filed between 2008 and 2015.90 
                                                          
 90.   We did not search cases after 2015 because we wanted to allow for a delay in Bloomberg’s 
gathering of dockets.  We did not search prior to 2008 because of concern about the completeness of 
Bloomberg’s coverage. 
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Bloomberg Law periodically downloads the bankruptcy dockets found 
in the federal courts’ database, PACER.  Bloomberg law allows the user 
to search by bankruptcy chapter, but following PACER, it records the 
active bankruptcy chapter or the bankruptcy chapter in which the case 
terminated.  As a result, our searches miss those cases that were filed in 
Chapter 11 but later converted to Chapter 7.  To get a sense of the 
importance of this limitation, consider that the Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts reports that there were 8,980 Chapter 11 cases in 2013,91 
but a search of Bloomberg Law for all Chapter 11 cases filed in 2013 yields 
just 7,494 cases. 
Bloomberg Law gives the user the ability to search by asset size with 
cut-offs at $100,000, $1,000,000 and $100,000,000.  It does not, however, 
allow the user to limit the search to corporate debtors, and individuals 
account for a substantial share of Chapter 11 filings.92  To limit the impact 
of individual filings, and to exclude extremely small businesses that may 
not have had significant trade debt, we ignored cases with less than 
$1,000,000 in assets.  We further divided our sample between those cases 
with over $100,000,000 in assets and those with assets between 
$1,000,000 and $100,000,000.  Most Chapter 11 cases have few valuable 
assets; omitting the small cases dropped our 2013 sample down to 3,523 
cases, 516 with more than $100 million in assets and 3,007 with between 
$1 million and $100 million.93 
We conducted two searches.  Search 1 looked for dockets with some 
derivation of the phrase “critical vendor.”  More specifically, Search 1 
looked for “(critical or essential) /4 (vendor or vendors).”  Unfortunately, 
debtors may not always use the phrase “critical vendor” when seeking 
permission to pay a favored creditor.  Search 2 was therefore much 
broader, “((pay or payment) /4 (prepetition or (pre /3 petition)) or ((critical 
or essential) /4 (vendor or vendors)) or 503(b)(9).”  Table 1 summarizes 
the results. 
  
                                                          
 91.   Table F-2—Bankr. Filing, supra note 77. 
 92.   See Hynes, Lawton & Howard, supra note 85, at 1 (finding that individuals account for more 
than a quarter of Chapter 11 filings). 
 93.   Some of the missing firms simply had no asset value reported.  To get a sense of how many, 
we searched the cases from December of 2013.  There appeared to be 256 cases with less than $1 
million and 33 cases with no estimation of assets.  
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Table 1: Critical Vendor Orders in Bankruptcy Cases 
 
Total Cases CVOs in Search 1 CVOs in Search 2 
1-100M 100M+ 1-100M 100M+ 1-100M 100M+ 
2008 2,616 806 51 (1.9%) 24 (3.0%) 337 (12.9%) 87 (10.8%) 
2009 3,943 2,038 85 (2.2%) 59 (2.9%) 567 (14.4%) 138 (6.8%) 
2010 3,838 886 101 (2.6%) 21 (2.4%) 548 (14.3%) 61 (6.9%) 
2011 3,568 335 76 (2.1%) 25 (7.5%) 456 (12.8%) 58 (17.3%) 
2012 3,038 558 73 (2.4%) 20 (3.6%) 381 (12.5%)  42 (7.5%) 
2013 3,007 516 62 (2.1%) 12 (2.3%) 371 (12.3%) 40 (7.8%) 
2014 2,240 390 53 (2.4%) 17 (4.4%) 331 (14.8%) 37 (9.5%) 
2015 2,126 588 80 (3.8%) 18 (3.1%) 338 (15.9%) 63 (10.7%) 
Total 24,376 6,117 581 (2.4%) 196 (3.2%) 3,329 (13.7%) 526 (8.6%) 
 
As one would expect, Search 2 found many more possible critical 
vendor orders than Search 1, but some of these could be false positives.  
For example, Search 2 could pick up a motion to recognize administrative 
expense status under § 506(b)(9).  If one adopts our broad definition of a 
critical vendor order (any repayment of a pre-petition debt prior to 
confirmation), false positives do not appear to be a significant concern.  
We randomly selected thirty cases identified by Search 2 in each of the 
two data sets ($1 million to $100 million and over $100 million), and 97% 
of each (29/30) had a broadly defined critical vendor order.  The results 
were quite different for the narrow definition of a critical vendor order 
(repayment of a prepetition debt with no asserted claim to priority).  Just 
47% (14/30) of the cases with more than $100 million in assets had a 
narrowly defined critical vendor order, and just 17% (5/30) of the smaller 
cases had such an order. 
Table 1 suggests rates of critical vendor orders that are quite low 
relative to the searches of the random sample and the large pubic company 
bankruptcies.  However, this result is misleading because of the difference 
between a firm and a corporation.  Most large firms are comprised of many 
separate legal entities.  When the firm files for bankruptcy, each legal 
entity files its own bankruptcy petition that is counted as a separate case 
by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  Such firms will usually 
ask the court to administratively consolidate or jointly administer the 
various cases, and the bankruptcy dockets of the consolidated cases will 
typically tell the reader to consult the lead case for all motions made after 
the consolidation.  Thus, because the motion for a critical vendor order 
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may be listed only on the lead case, the percentage of cases with a critical 
vendor order on their dockets may understate the true prevelance of these 
orders.94  To address this problem, we adopted an expedient method of 
estimating the number of bankrupt firms.  We assumed two cases were 
consolidated if they were listed sequentially–by filing date– and assigned 
to the same bankruptcy judge.  Table 2 presents the results. 
 
Table 2: Critical Vendor Orders in Bankrupt “Firms” 
  




100M+ 1-100M 100M+ 1-100M 100M+ 
2008 1,911 160 38 (2.0%) 22 (13.8%) 275 (14.4%) 81 (50.6%) 
2009 2,898 294 82 (2.8%) 58 (19.7%) 490 (16.9%) 133 (45.2%) 
2010 2,960 119 96 (3.2%) 21 (17.6%) 478 (16.1%) 56 (47.1%) 
2011 2,990 89 63 (2.1%) 23 (25.8%) 399 (13.3%) 49 (55.1%) 
2012 2,467 76 68 (2.8%) 20 (26.3%) 350 (14.2%) 41 (53.9%) 
2013 2,476 64 55 (2.2%) 11 (17.2%) 339 (13.7%) 37 (57.8%) 
2014 1,860 67 51 (2.7%) 17 (25.4%) 289 (15.5%) 37 (55.2%) 
2015 1,695 82 68 (4.0%) 16 (19.5%) 295 (17.4%) 42 (51.2%) 
Total 19,257 951 521 (2.7%) 188 (19.8%) 2,915 (15.1%) 476 (50.1%) 
Our expedient method of estimating “firms” adds an additional source 
of error.  Based on our search of random samples of cases, we are fairly 
confident that we did not dramatically underestimate the number of 
independent firms.95  In fact, we may have substantially overestimated the 
number of firms with less than $100 million in assets because we were not 
able to exclude individual filings.  Although we restricted our attention to 
cases with more than $1 million in assets, 37% (11/30) of a random sample 
of independent cases with assets between $1 million and $100 million 
                                                          
 94.   Note that this was not a problem for a random sample of Chapter 11 cases and the sample 
of large public company bankruptcies above because we simply ignored those cases that were 
consolidated into another case. 
 95.   Among the cases that our method identified as converted into another case, we randomly 
selected thirty with assets between $1 million and $100 million and thirty with assets in excess of $100 
million.  Of those with less than $100 million in assets, only two were actually independent cases.  
However, eight were consolidated with a case with more than $100 million in assets and one was 
consolidated with a case with less than $1 million in assets.  Of the cases with more than $100 million 
in assets, none were independent.  However, two were consolidated into cases with less than $100 
million in assets, and one was consolidated into a case that converted into Chapter 7. 
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were filed by individuals.96  Notably, our searchs of samples of  cases 















Although we caution against relying on our precise estimates, our 
results suggest that more thorough research would likely still reach four 
conclusions.  First, critical vendor orders do occur, but they are by no 
means universal.  Our random sample of firms in Chapter 11 found that 
less than 17% of cases had critical vendor orders, broadly defined, and we 
estimated a similar 20% for “firms” in our $1 million to $100 million 
Bloomberg sample.  Second, many critical vendor orders authorize 
payment to creditors who might otherwise enjoy priority over general 
creditors.  For example, the percentage of the random sample with critical 
vendor orders drops below 7% if one excludes repayment of creditors who 
claim priority.  Third, it does not appear that the use of these orders has 
been strongly increasing over the last decade.  To demonstrate this, Figure 
1 presents the information in Table 2 graphically.  Although some of the 
lines do have positive slopes, the slopes are quite gradual.  Fourth, these 
                                                          
 96.   This rate is even higher than that found by Hynes, Lawton, and Howard.  See Hynes, Lawton, 
and Howard, supra note 85, at 11 (finding that individuals accounted for about thirty percent of 
Chapter 11 cases).  One reason for this discrepancy is that the ABI project looked at individual filings 
as a percentage of cases while this figure lists individuals as a percentage of independent cases, and 
corporate bankruptcies are much more likely to be consolidated.  Id. at 30 (finding that individual 
Chapter 11s are rarely administratively or substantively consolidated). 
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orders appear to be much more common in the very largest bankruptcies.  
For example, even if we restrict our attention to the repayment of general 
creditors, more than 56% of the large, public company bankruptcies filed 
in 2015 had a narrowly defined critical vendor order while just 7% of our 
random sample of Chapter 11 bankruptcies had such an order.  Similarly, 
20% of “firms” in our $1 million to $100 million Bloomberg sample had 
a critical vendor revealed by Search 2 while over half of “firms” in our 
over $100 million Bloomberg sample had such an order. 
Our research has important limitations.  For example, we did not try 
to determine whether the recipients of the payments had a valid claim to 
priority or whether courts carefully scrutinized the debtor’s assertions that 
the vendors were critical.97  We also did not try to determine the 
significance of the payments by, for example, comparing the dollar 
amount distributed to the total assets available for distribution to 
unsecured creditors.   
Despite these limitations, our tentative results still raise interesting 
questions.  One is why critical vendor orders are much more frequent in 
large firm bankruptcies than in comparatively small ones.98  This could be 
due to differences in the large firms’ asset configurations, the industries in 
which these firms operate, or simply in the legal strategies pursued by 
large firms’ bankruptcy lawyers.  For example, there may be little reason 
to make a critical vendor payment if the debtor plans to liquidate. 
Another question is why the frequency of critical vendor orders do not 
vary more sharply across time.  In a study of roll-ups, Tung argues that he 
should have found a decrease in the use of roll-ups after the end of the 
recession because credit became more available and roll-ups should 
therefore have become less necessary for a firm to obtain debtor-in-
possession financing.99  A similar argument might be made for critical 
vendor orders.  One compelling rationale for a critical vendor payment is 
that the critical vendor is itself financially distressed and may go out of 
business if not repaid.  This contention is more compelling during a 
recession or industry-wide financial stress. 
                                                          
 97.   Shumejda found that in none of her sixty-three cases was a request for a critical vendor order 
denied.  See Shumejda, supra note 81, at 170. 
 98.   This remains true even if one accounts for the prevalence of individual filings in the $1 
million to $100 million Bloomberg sample. 
 99.   See Tung, supra note 53, at 26. 
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IV. IS THE PARETO STANDARD THE RIGHT TEST? 
Part I demonstrates that courts routinely adopt tests that require a 
Pareto improvement to allow a deviation from bankruptcy’s standard 
priority rules.  However, there are alternatives.  A few courts have simply 
refused to allow deviations,100 and scholars argue that most courts do not 
take the existing (Pareto) tests seriously.101  Section A describes what 
economists mean by Pareto efficiency in more detail as well as its primary 
alternative in the economic analysis of public policy: Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency.  Section B explains why courts are naturally drawn to Pareto 
efficiency when formulating legal rules that apply when protecting 
property rights in bankruptcy.  Section C describes the most significant 
shortcoming of requiring a Pareto improvement: it can prevent deviations 
that maximize the value of the estate.  Section D describes some offsetting 
benefits of requiring a Pareto improvement. 
A. Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks Improvements 
Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality is a standard tool in the 
economic analysis of public policy.102  An allocation or policy choice is 
not Pareto optimal if there is some reallocation of resources or other policy 
choice that would be a Pareto improvement.  An outcome is a Pareto 
improvement or Pareto superior if someone is better off and no one is 
worse off.103  The Kmart test described above requires a Pareto 
improvement for a deviation from priority as it requires that the deviation 
“at least leave [the disfavored creditors] no worse off.”104  That is, the 
                                                          
 100.   See, e.g., In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., 963 F.2d 1490, 1495–96 (11th Cir. 1992); Official 
Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987); In re Tenney Vill. Co., 
104 B.R. 562, 564–70 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989); In re Monach Circuit Indus., Inc., 41 B.R. 859, 862 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984). 
 101.   See Skeel, supra note 1, at 717 (“Bankruptcy judges rarely require a debtor to present any 
meaningful evidence that a supplier truly is irreplaceable and would cease doing business with the 
debtor unless it is paid in full.”); Roe & Tung, supra note 79, at 1257 (“In practice, few lower courts 
expend much energy making the judgments that the Seventh Circuit thought appropriate. Debtors ask 
that the old vendors be paid and courts approve those requests”). 
 102.   See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 136 (1992) (“Pareto optimality is almost 
certainly the most widely used criterion in modern welfare economics.”). 
 103.   See JULIAN LE GRAND, EQUITY AND CHOICE: AN ESSAY IN ECONOMICS AND APPLIED 
PHILOSOPHY 32 (1991); AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 21 (1970).  
There are two different Pareto standards: strong and weak.  The strong Pareto test counts an outcome 
a Pareto improvement if it makes at least one person better off and no person worse off than the status 
quo ante.  See PER-OLOV JOHANSSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN WELFARE ECONOMICS 10 
(1991).  A “weak” Pareto standard counts an outcome as a Pareto improvement only if it makes all 
people better off.  See id.  The Pareto standard described in the text states a strong Pareto test. 
 104.   In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 873 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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Kmart test would not allow a deviation from the standard priority rules 
unless the standard rules are not Pareto optimal. 
In Czyzewiski v. Jevic Holding Corp.,105 the Supreme Court used 
language that an economist would recognize as weak Pareto efficiency.106  
That is, the Supreme Court would allow a deviation from the standard rules 
only if the deviation is strictly preferred by all parties.107  According to the 
Court not only must the deviation leave the disfavored creditors no worse 
off, it must “make even the disfavored creditors better off.”108  Most tests 
for substantive consolidation also require a Pareto improvement.  For 
example, the Second Circuit insists that “consolidation will benefit all 
creditors”109 and the Third Circuit insists that “separating [the entities] is 
prohibitive and hurts all creditors.”110 
In a Coaseian world without transaction costs,111 policymakers would 
not need a concept of Pareto optimality.  Indeed, policymakers would not 
need to do much at all.  If a reallocation or policy change were a Pareto 
improvement, the parties would voluntarily adopt the change through 
bargaining.  Policymakers need only intervene if there are some frictions 
that make this bargaining impossible.  But frictions can also limit the 
usefulness of Pareto efficiency.  Too many allocations can be described as 
Pareto optimal because most policy choices will leave at least one person 
worse off.  Consider a somewhat whimsical example.  Assume aliens offer 
a cure for cancer for free.  Accepting this cure would almost certainly not 
be a Pareto improvement.  Drug companies would see the value of their 
patented cancer drugs fall, and some cancer specialists would see a sharp 
decline in the value of their human capital.  The gain from a cure from 
cancer would be enormous, and society could, in theory, compensate the 
losers so that the change was a Pareto improvement.  However, this can be 
difficult in practice as it is sometimes hard to identify the losers and 
determine how much they lost. 
Economists therefore sometimes use a refinement of Pareto 
efficiency: Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  An allocation is a Kaldor-Hicks 
improvement if the winners gain sufficiently more than the losers lose so 
that the winners could hypothetically compensate the losers and still come 
                                                          
 105.   137 S. Ct. 973, 985 (2017). 
 106.   See supra note 103. 
 107.   See Czyzewiski, 137 S. Ct. at 985. 
 108.   See id. 
 109.   In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 110.   In re Owens Corning Corp., 419 F.3d 195, 211 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 111.   See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (introducing 
the theory of a hypothetical world without transaction costs). 
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out ahead.112  A cure for cancer, for example, would be a Kaldor-Hicks 
improvement, as the benefits of this cure would surely be greater than its 
costs.  The allocation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if no further Kaldor-Hicks 
improvement can be made.113  The D.C. Circuit’s test for substantive 
consolidation requires a Kaldor-Hicks improvement, as it insists that “the 
demonstrated benefits of consolidation ‘heavily’ outweigh the harm.”114  
A Kaldor-Hicks improvement does not, however, require that the 
compensation take place.115  As a result, it is indifferent to distribution and 
the original allocation of entitlements. 
B. Property Rights and the Pareto Improvements in Bankruptcy 
Outside bankruptcy, courts protect property rights with either property 
rules or liability rules.116  A property rule allows the property owner to set 
the terms under which its property can used by others.117  The owner 
therefore fixes the price, if any, it is willing to accept for that use.118  By 
contrast, a liability rule allows a third party, such as a court, to set the 
compensation owed for use of the property.119  For example, if the 
government wishes to take property by eminent domain, it must pay 
compensatory damages determined after the taking.120  This is a liability 
rule.  The government can take property as long as it is willing to pay the 
owner an amount set by the court.  Similarly, someone who accidentally 
damages your car must pay compensatory damages determined after the 
fact.  However, nonbankruptcy law generally does not allow non-owners 
to seek permission to intentionally damage property in advance at a price 
to be set by the court, and someone who intentionally infringes upon the 
                                                          
 112.   See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 378 (2d ed. 
1965); J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, 
Welfare Propositions of Economic and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). 
 113.   See Hicks, supra note 112, at 701. 
 114.   In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 115.   Both Kaldor and Hicks themselves took the question of actual compensation to be a separate 
question.  See Kaldor, supra note 112, at 550 (“Whether the landlords [i.e., the losers], in the free-
trade case, should in fact be given compensation or not, is a political question, on which the economist, 
qua economist, could hardly pronounce an opinion.”); Hicks, supra note 112, at 711 (“[W]hether or 
not compensation should be given in any particular case is a question of distribution, upon which there 
cannot be identity of interest, and so there cannot be any generally acceptable principle.”). 
 116.   See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing the intersection 
of property rules and liability rules). 
 117.   Id. at 1092. 
 118.   See id. 
 119.   See id. at 1092–93. 
 120.   See infra note 150. 
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property of another may face punitive damages and imprisonment.121  This 
protection of entitlements is called a “property rule” because it requires 
the consent of the property owner, preserving the right of the property 
owner (not the court or the non-owner) to determine how the property will 
be used.122  Unlike a liability rule, a property rule enables the owner to set 
the price for its use. 
Bankruptcy substantially weakens the ability of property owners to 
determine how their assets are used.  One extreme example is In re 
Plastech Engineered Products, Inc.123  Plastech supplied parts to Chrysler 
using tools purportedly owned by Chrysler.124  When Chrysler tried to 
terminate the relationship and exercise its right to retrieve the tools, 
Plastech filed for bankruptcy.125  The bankruptcy court decided that 
because Plastech had a mere possessory interest in the tools (they were 
located at its plant), it could continue to use them against Chrysler’s wishes 
if it offered Chrysler “adequate protection.” 126 
Someone who has an interest in property that the debtor intends to use, 
sell or lease can demand adequate protection.127  A debtor’s failure to 
provide adequate protection is grounds for lifting bankruptcy’s automatic 
stay and allowing repossession of the property.128  Adequate protection is 
designed to protect the owner against the risk that the value of her property 
will decline.129  Sometimes this will require payments to compensate for 
the depreciation.130  Sometimes adequate protection will require 
replacement security.131  Sometimes the court will say nothing additional 
is needed.132  One can think of adequate protection as an approximation of 
                                                          
 121.   See CAL. PENAL CODE § 601 (West 2010, Supp. 2014) (criminal trespass of residence, real 
property or workplace punishable by imprisonment or fine); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-21 (West 2009) 
(criminal trespass punishable as a misdemeanor); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 
159 (Wis. 1997) (explaining the need for punitive damages even where the actual harm is slight); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (explaining that punitive 
damages are recoverable for harmless trespass on land when trespass is in complete disregard of 
owner’s property interest). 
 122.   See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 116. 
 123.   382 B.R. 90 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 124.   Id. at 95–98. 
 125.   Id. at 102–03. 
 126.   Id. at 106–11. 
 127.   See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2012).  
 128.   Id. § 362(d). 
 129.   See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 361.02[2] (16th ed. 2017). 
 130.   See 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (2012). 
 131.   Id. § 361(2). 
 132.   See, e.g., In re Podzemny, No. 09-14226-j11, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 567, at *29 (Bankr. D. 
N.M. 2011) (finding a 30% equity cushion sufficient, combined with cash collateral orders, to 
adequately protect creditor’s interest in collateral); In re Campbell Sod, Inc., 378 B.R. 647, 654–55 
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a Pareto test.  It is an approximation, because adequate protection does not 
actually ensure that the property owner is no worse off.  This is so for four 
reasons.  First, the protection ordered by a court sometimes turns out to be 
inadequate, and the asset declines in value.133  Second, adequate protection 
does not compensate the owner for the time-value of money.134  Third, if 
the debtor intends to use the collateral, the court must value the collateral 
at its replacement value even if the judge thinks that the secured creditor 
would receive much less in a reorganization.135  Fourth, courts are split as 
to the timing of the valuation.  Some courts value the collateral as of the 
time of filing while others value the collateral as of the time of the demand 
for adequate protection.136  Courts that take the latter approach only use a 
property rule once the property owner asks for it.   
Bankruptcy uses adequate protection as a substitute for consent 
because the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code thought that the bargaining 
process would not always work perfectly.  For example, if Plastech 
desparately needed the tools, Chrysler could threaten to seize them unless 
given a substantial accommodation.  Adequate protection therefore shifts 
some of the bargaining power toward the debtor.  Adequate protection is 
most often used in connection with secured credit.  A security interest is a 
property right that allows the secured creditor to seize the collateral if the 
debtor does not complete the promised performance (often the repayment 
of a debt).137  However, inside of bankruptcy the debtor can continue to 
use the collateral after a default as long as it offers adequate protection.138  
The debtor can grant a new creditor first priority in that collateral if it 
offers the old creditor adequate protection.139 
The Bankruptcy Code imposes an additional Pareto test on the secured 
creditor at the end of the case.  A debtor can approve a plan of 
                                                          
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2007) (finding a secured lender was adequately protected by an equity cushion where 
its collateral was likely to increase in value and debtor had a good prospect of reorganization); cf. 
Wilmington Tr. Co. v. AMR Corp. (In re AMR Corp.), 490 B.R. 470, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting 
the existence of an equity cushion “seems to be the preferred test in determining whether priming of a 
senior lien is appropriate under [11 U.S.C.] 364”). 
 133.   When this happens, the Bankruptcy Code provides the secured creditor with an 
administrative expense that has priority over all other administrative expenses except post-petition 
financing extended pursuant to § 364(c)(1).  See 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012). 
 134.   See United Savs. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 
381–82 (1988). 
 135.   See Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 964 (1997) (“In sum, under § 506(a), 
the value of property retained because the debtor has exercised the . . . ‘cram down’ option is the cost 
the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same ‘proposed TTT use.’”). 
 136.   See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 361.02[2], [3] (16th ed. 2017). 
 137.   See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003). 
 138.   See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 362(d) (2012). 
 139.   Id. § 364(d). 
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reorganization that allows the debtor to keep the secured creditor’s 
collateral without completing the promised performance as long as the 
debtor makes a new promise that the court believes has a value equivalent 
to the value of the security interest.140  Once again, this is not a purely 
Pareto test because of how the value of a secured claim is determined.141 
This treatment of security interests reflects a belief that neither 
bargaining nor markets work perfectly in bankruptcy.  If bargaining were 
costless, the debtor and the secured party would reach an agreement to 
pursue the efficient strategy regardless of the rule.  If markets worked 
perfectly, the debtor could simply borrow more and repay the fully-
secured creditor in full if the secured creditor refused to consent to an 
efficient use of the collateral.  This raises the question whether it make 
sense to use the same Pareto standard to protect non-property interests. 
The next section describes a cost of using the Pareto test: it can lead to 
inefficient liquidation.  This is not surprising.  The Kaldor-Hicks test was 
developed precisely because the more demanding Pareto standard prevents 
some wealth-improving transactions.  In Section D, we discuss some 
reasons why a Pareto standard nonetheless may still be attractive. 
C. Problems with the Pareto Standard 
Bankruptcy law could protect statutory priority entitlements with 
property rules by requiring the entitlement holder’s consent for any 
deviation from priority.  However, courts intuitively understand that, 
because bargaining is costly, this rule could destroy wealth.  They adopt a 
Pareto standard on the grounds that if the disfavored creditors are at least 
as well off, they have no legitimate grounds for objection.142  However, 
there are several problems with imposing a Pareto standard.  First, 
bankruptcy law is inconsistent and does not always impose such a 
standard.  Second, while Pareto standards sometimes reduce the 
information that a court must acquire, in the reorganization context a 
Pareto standard will usually require more information than a Kaldor-Hicks 
standard.  Finally, a Pareto standard can lead to inefficient liquidation. 
                                                          
 140.   Id. § 1129(b)(2). 
 141.   See supra text accompanying notes 133–136. 
 142.   Cf. In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that critical vendor 
payment might be allowable under 363(b) if disfavored creditors are made better off as a result than if 
they were to receive a liquidation distribution); In re Crawford, 324 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that the separate classification of claims resulting in disproportionate payment to different 
classes is permissible if the payment leaves disfavored creditors better off). 
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In Jevic, the Supreme Court reversed a decision that paid lower 
priority general unsecured creditors instead of priority worker claims 
because the payments failed to pass a Pareto test; the workers were not 
better off.143  However, bankruptcy law frequently countenances decisions 
that benefit one creditor at the expense of another.  Here, we briefly discuss 
two. 
Consider the facts of Jevic.  The funds to be distributed were from a 
settlement of a fraudulent conveyance lawsuit brought against a secured 
creditor.144  Because such suits tend to have a low probability of success 
and a high payout when they succeed, they create an inherent conflict 
between senior and junior claimants with regard to settlement.  Consider 
a simple example.  Assume Debtor, who is in bankruptcy, owes $100 in 
priority claims, such as unpaid wages, and some arbitrarily large amount 
to general unsecured creditors.  Debtor has no assets except for a 
fraudulent transfer action that it has brought against a secured creditor.  
This suit will succeed with probability ps, and, if successful, recover $500.  
Assume the secured creditor offers a settlement of $100.  Unless the estate 
is certain to prevail against the secured creditor, ps =1, the priority claims 
are better off if the estate accepts the settlement because settlement repays 
the priority claimant in full.  On the other hand, unless there is no chance 
that the estate would prevail, ps=0, the general creditor is better off if the 
estate rejects the settlement and proceeds to trial because all of the 
proceeds of the settlement would go to the priority creditor.  If the default 
rule is to go to trial, a Pareto test would prohibit the settlement.  
Alternatively, if the default rule is to settle, a Pareto test would require 
acceptance of the settlement.  The law does not do this, and instead expects 
the debtor-in-possession to maximize the value of the estate,145 applying a 
Kaldor-Hicks rule and accepting the settlement if ps <0.2. 
These same numbers can be used to demonstrate that the choice 
between reorganization and liquidation also creates a conflict.  Assume 
that the claims are the same but that the choice is between a liquidation 
that would yield $100 and a reorganization that would yield $500 with 
probability ps.  Here, the general unsecured creditors have nothing to gain 
from a liquidation because the entire $100 would go to the priority 
                                                          
 143.   See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 986 (2017). 
 144.   Id. at 980. 
 145.   11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012) (noting that a debtor in possession is charged with duties of 
trustee); La. World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 252–53 (5th Cir. 1988); LaSalle Nat’l 
Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 292–93 (D. Del. 2000); In re R.H. Macy & Co., 170 B.R. 69, 
74–75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a Chapter 11 debtor, acting as trustee, has a duty to act in 
best interest of the estate). 
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claim.146  By contrast, the priority claim has nothing to gain from an 
attempted reorganization.  The Code requires the full repayment of many 
priority creditors in a plan of reorganization,147 but a failed attempt at a 
reorganization can leave the firm unable to meet this burden and can lead 
to a liquidation that yields less than would have been yielded in an 
immediate liquidation. 
Perhaps the reason why bankruptcy law does not apply a Pareto test to 
every decision is that a Pareto test requires some default rule or 
entitlement.  Property rights provide clear entitlements, but in other cases 
the appropriate default rule is not always clear.  Courts could remedy this 
deficiency.  For example, they could decide that the default should be that 
all claims should be prosecuted to trial or that a firm’s assets should be 
liquidated and require that those who wish to deviate from these positions 
satisfy a Pareto test.  However, neither the Bankruptcy Code nor business 
considerations provide a good reason to adopt these as default rules rather 
than the rule that all claims should be settled and all firms should attempt 
a reorganization.  By contrast, bankruptcy’s priority rules do provide a 
fairly compelling default rule for distribution, a matter we return to 
below.148 
Even if this inconsistency is a problem, it is not unique to bankruptcy.  
For example, if the government physically occupies private property, the 
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution protects the property 
with a liability rule.149  The property owner is entitled to compensation 
equal to the value (generally, the market value) of the property taken.150  
However, if the government takes a substantial portion of the economic 
value of the property through regulation, the law applies a vague balancing 
test, and property owners rarely prevail in the reported cases.151  Consider 
also the law of trespass.  Property owners can enjoin a threatened 
intentional trespass and sometimes can receive punitive damages if the 
trespass has occurred.152  However, if the law classifies the trespass as 
accidental, their property right is protected at most with a liability rule.153  
                                                          
 146.   See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2012). 
 147.   Id. § 1129(a)(9). 
 148.   See infra Section III.C.1. 
 149.   U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 150.   See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943).  
 151.   See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606, 630–32 (2001). 
 152.   See Gallegos v. Lloyd, 178 P.3d 922, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (holding that punitive 
damages may be awarded only if plaintiff proves that trespass was willful and malicious); Henry E. 
Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1723 (2004). 
 153.   See, e.g., Simms v. Majors, 344 S.E.2d 501, 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (holding punitive 
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We say “at most” because the law may impose a negligence standard that 
amounts to a Kaldor-Hicks test; the tortfeasor is only liable if the expected 
damages exceed the cost of precautions. 
Requiring a Pareto improvement may also destroy wealth because 
some wealth maximizing reallocations will leave some parties worse off.  
The basic problem with a requirement of a Pareto improvement for a 
deviation from ordinary priority rules is the same problem present when 
using a Pareto test for public policy: it does not consider the size of the 
gains of the winners (here, the favored parties).  Consider a simple 
example of a court considering a motion for a critical vendor order filed 
by Debtor.  Debtor has $100,000 in cash and no other assets.  Debtor owes 
$50,000 to the IRS, $50,000 to Vendor and $450,000 to Bank. All of the 
creditors are unsecured, but the IRS has priority under § 507(a)(8) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
If Debtor is immediately liquidated, the IRS would receive the entire 
$50,000 and be paid in full.  All other creditors would get 10 cents on the 
dollar; Vendor would get $5,000, and Bank would get $45,000.  Debtor 
can instead use $50,000 of its $100,000 in cash to buy more goods from 
Vendor and try to reorganize.  If the reorganization succeeds, Debtor will 
have the remaining $50,000 in cash plus assets worth $200,000.  If it fails, 
Debtor would just have the remaining $50,000 in cash.  The probability of 
success is ps. 
Vendor claims that it cannot or will not deliver the new goods unless 
Debtor pays its $50,000 prepetition debt in full in addition to paying 
$50,000 for the new goods ($100,000 in total).  If Debtor cannot convince 
Vendor to deliver without paying and cannot find an alternative supplier, 
the payment would be a true critical vendor payment because the payment 
is necessary for any chance of a reorganization.  The probability that 
payment is a true critical vendor payment is pCV. 
If we are trying to maximize aggregate wealth or seeking Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency, Debtor should elect reorganization as long as 
ps$200,000>$50,000, or the probability of success exceeds 25%.  The 
probability that the payment is a true critical vendor payment is irrelevant 
because its only effect is distributional.  If the reorganization would have 
proceeded in the absence of the payment, then the amount the IRS and the 
Bank lost from the repayment of Vendor is precisely offset by Vendor’s 
gain.  To apply a Kaldor-Hicks test, the judge and the trustee or debtor-in-
                                                          
damages unavailable when trespass involving cutting of timber is innocent); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1979) (stating that punitive damages are not awarded for 
“mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and the like”); cf. Harrod Concrete & Stone Co. v. 
Crutcher, 458 S.W.3d 290, 294 (Ky. 2015) (noting that the damages measure for trespass depends on 
whether the trespass is innocent or willful).  
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possession need only estimate the probability of success or the going 
concern value of the firm relative to its liquidation value.  Even when they 
overestimate the probability of success, the loss in social wealth comes not 
from the repayment of the old debt but from the investment in the new 
project.  The repayment of the old debt is just a question of distribution, 
which is irrelevant under the Kaldor-Hicks standard. 
Now consider a rule that requires a Pareto improvement to justify a 
deviation.  Tests for critical vendor orders that are based on the Pareto 
principle can be much more complicated to apply than rules based on the 
Kaldor-Hicks standard.  But the application is not complicated in this 
stylized example because a Pareto improvement is only possible if success 
is certain.  Note that because the IRS has priority,154 it is repaid in full in a 
liquidation.  As a result, it is only ensured of being no worse off if there 
will certainly be enough assets to repay the IRS in full in an attempted 
reorganization.155  This is just an example of the conflict between senior 
and junior claimants.  Because of the inherent option, the senior claimant 
is biased against continuation.  There is a way to ensure that the IRS is no 
worse off.  If the IRS’s seniority was based on a security interest (if it had 
a property interest), it could demand “adequate protection” such as a 
security interest in other assets to protect it against the decline in the value 
of its collateral prior to the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.  The 
Debtor could take a similar approach here, securing the IRS’s consent by 
offering it a security interest.  This means that a true Pareto test may import 
an adequate protection right for creditors with statutory priority, a right 
that they now lack.  That is, a true Pareto test would grant priority claims 
a quasi-property right. 
Ordinarily, junior claimants are biased towards continuation.  But in 
this example the effect of the critical vendor order more than offsets this 
bias and biases Bank toward liquidation.  Note that a successful 
reorganization following a critical vendor order would give Bank 
$150,000, as the IRS must be paid out of the $200,000 in total assets.  If 
these debts are not paid in advance and there is still a reorganization, Bank 
would get $180,000, as there would be $250,000 in total assets and Bank 
would be entitled to ($450/$500) multiplied by the $200,000 remaining 
after the IRS is repaid.  If the reorganization fails, Bank would get nothing 
as the remaining $50,000 would be used to pay the IRS.  Therefore, Bank 
                                                          
 154.   See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2012). 
 155.   The Bankruptcy Code would require the full repayment of the IRS in a plan of 
reorganization, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (2012), but the firm may lack the assets necessary to do so and 
thus may be forced to liquidate.  
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is made no worse off by a critical vendor order if: pS$150,000 
pCV$45,000+(1- pCV)pS $180,000. 
The first lesson the example teaches is that the Pareto standard 
requires the trustee (debtor-in-possession) and the court to do more work.  
Ordinarily one would think that Pareto tests are easier to apply than 
Kaldor-Hicks tests because when applying a Pareto test a court need only 
estimate the impact of the change on the disfavored party while a Kaldor-
Hicks test requires the court to estimate this loss relative to the gain of the 
favored party.  This is similar to the debate over strict liability and 
negligence.  A negligence rule requires a court to engage in a difficult cost-
benefit analysis as the court must weigh the cost of precautions against the 
expected cost of an accident.  By contrast, strict liability only requires the 
court to estimate the plaintiff’s loss, and the defendant may be in a better 
position to engage in the cost-benefit analysis because the defendant may 
have better information about the precautionary costs.156  Similarly, the 
Pareto rule of adequate protection may economize on information because 
the court need only estimate the risk of depreciation of an asset and need 
not consider the prospects of the firm’s reorganization because the amount 
to which the secured claim is entitled is unrelated to the success of the 
reorganization. 
However, this is not generally true for rules that protect unsecured 
claims.  Although unsecured claims are never entitled to more than full 
payment, this usually is not a binding constraint; in bankruptcy, the 
unsecured claims are often residual claims.  As a result, the court must 
estimate the prospects of the reorganization, here given by the probability 
of success, to estimate the amount that the unsecured claims would 
receive.  This is the same information required in a Kaldor-Hicks test.  
However, to apply a Pareto test, the court must also determine whether 
reorganization would be possible without the critical vendor payment; 
they need to also estimate pCV.  This difficulty becomes progressively 
worse if we added another demand for an early payment such as a demand 
for a roll-up. 
Even if we assume that paying Vendor is necessary for any chance at 
a reorganization, pCV =1, a rule requiring a Pareto improvement can still 
lead to inefficient liquidation.  While a reorganization is socially optimal 
if ps 0.25, Bank is worse off if ps <0.30.  This bias toward liquidation may 
appear small, but remember that the critical vendor effect had to overcome 
                                                          
 156.   See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 215 (6th ed. 2016).  
Occasionally a negligence rule will be less taxing.  Id. at 223–24.  For example, it may be obvious that 
the precautionary costs far exceed the defendant’s loss, and the court can avoid the necessity of 
estimating damages by simply reassigning the entitlement by declaring that the action is not negligent.  
Id.  
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the fact that the IRS’s senior position biased Bank toward reorganization.  
The critical vendor bias becomes much stronger when there is a strong 
chance that the payment is not actually necessary for a reorganization.  For 
example, if there is a 50% chance that the reorganization could proceed 
without the early repayment of vendor, pCV =0.5, a critical vendor payment 
makes Bank worse off if the probability of success is less than 75%, ps 
<0.75.  Denying a critical vendor order does not guarantee liquidation; in 
this example there is still a 50% chance that the firm will reorganize 
anyway because the vendor was not critical.  But it does mean that courts 
should deny critical vendor orders for firms with going concern value even 
though there is an even chance that this will mean liquidation. 
Debtor, Vendor and Bank could avoid inefficient liquidation through 
bargaining.  Vendor could demand less than full repayment of its 
prepetition claim in exchange for Bank’s consent.  However, if bargaining 
were costless, strong property rules that required consent for a deviation 
would suffice.  Even without consent, Vendor could still satisfy a Pareto 
test by demanding less than a full $50,000 payment or offer some 
offsetting payment so that the IRS and Bank are no worse off.  There are 
at least two problems with this approach.  First, Vendors often demand 
early payment because they say that they are liquidity constrained, and 
there is a chance that they are not bluffing.  Second, a court would still 
need to determine ps and pCV to determine the payments required. 
D. In Defense of the Pareto Standard 
Bankruptcy law could dispense with a Pareto test and require that the 
disfavored parties actually consent to any deviation from ordinary priority 
rules.  This is, in fact, what bankruptcy law does at the plan confirmation 
stage.  Absent their consent, a court simply cannot confirm a plan of 
reorganization that fails to pay administrative expenses in full and in cash 
or that fails to pay unsecured creditors in full if equity holders receive any 
value under the plan.157  At that stage of the process, bankruptcy law 
requires the debtor to negotiate and obtain the consent of at least a super-
majority of the claims in a disfavored class.158  A Pareto standard makes 
sense earlier in the process if time constraints make bargaining costly or 
impossible.  Debtors often seek approval of critical vendor orders and roll-
ups as part of their “first day orders,” and they argue that delay could be 
fatal to a reorganization.  Time is less obviously a factor in substantive 
                                                          
 157.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A), (b) (2012). 
 158.  Id. § 1126 (requiring, for class approval, two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in 
number of claims). 
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consolidation.  However, in many of these cases, the very argument for 
substantive consolidation is that a failure to follow corporate formalities 
makes it impossible to know which creditors have claims against which 
entity, and thus there are no clear entitlements from which to begin 
bargaining. 
We defend the Pareto test against the Kaldor-Hicks alternative.  Some 
commentators think that the law should adopt the latter.  For example, 
David Skeel recently recommended that, where not prohibited by the 
Bankruptcy Code, courts should approve the trustee’s decisions that 
maximize asset values of the estate and therefore maximize aggregate 
creditor recoveries.159  They should not worry about the equality of 
distribution as long as the deviations from equality are predictable and the 
trustee is not self-dealing. 
We are doubtful.  For one thing, there is an initial problem about the 
recommendation for bankruptcy law.  If the trustee is charged with 
maximizing asset values, without regard to distribution, why not permit 
dispositions that increase the expected social welfare even if they reduce 
recoveries to creditors?  For instance, assume that liquidation of the 
debtor’s assets would give creditors more than they would receive in 
reorganization by an amount X.  Why not allow the reorganization 
nonetheless if it produces community benefits that exceed the reduction in 
payoffs to creditors by at least X?  If distribution to creditors is not a 
constraint on the disposition of estate assets, there is no reason a priori to 
take into account only the interests of creditors.160  There are two further 
doubts.  First, higher courts may wish to use a Pareto test (or the even more 
extreme consent rule) to limit the power of bankruptcy courts either 
because of separation of powers concerns or because of concerns that 
informational constraints and agency costs will lead to biased decision-
making.  Second, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion ignores distributional 
considerations, and these may matter.  It is morally important that losers 
actually be compensated for their loss, not just that the change is 
sufficiently beneficial that the winners could have compensated them and 
realized a profit.  Some have suggested that giving debtors and courts more 
flexibility will lead to more equitable distributions, but the existing 
                                                          
 159.   See Skeel, supra note 1, at 703 (“[T]he real issues . . . are policing self-dealing, reducing the 
risk of ‘secret liens,’ or maximizing the value of the debtor’s assets.”); cf. Richard A. Posner, 
Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1154–55 
(2000) (advocating the Kaldor-Hicks standard to guide common law decision making). 
 160.   Below, we offer one possible reason and argue that this reason may also suggest that 
respecting the priority among creditors matters as well.  See infra notes 183–184 and accompanying 
text. 
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evidence does not clearly support this claim.  Finally, ignoring the standard 
priority rules can have adverse effects on ex ante incentives. 
1. Limiting the Power of Bankruptcy Courts 
Suppose that A, who is rich and has a great need for B’s property, 
takes it without B’s consent.  A argues that theft should not be illegal if he 
wants the item more than B and is willing and able to pay more than B is 
willing to pay to retain his own property.  He would be right if courts used 
a Kaldor-Hicks test to determine whether a thief could take the property 
of another.  However that is just not what our courts do, and even those 
who have advocated giving the bankrupt debtor more flexibility in 
deciding whom to pay do not explicitly argue that the debtor should be 
able to ignore property rights such as security interests. 
The doctrines that we discuss do not threaten property rights as long 
as courts measure “adequate protection” correctly.  For example, if a 
debtor wants to use cash collateral to make critical vendor payments, it 
must offer the secured creditor adequate protection.161  The doctrines do, 
however, threaten statutory priority rights.  That is, critical vendor 
payments and roll-ups threaten the requirement that some unsecured 
creditors be paid before others and that when there is no reason to place 
one creditor above another they should share pro rata.  Should these 
statutory priority rules be treated like property rights?  We are inclined to 
say yes, but why?  Part of the answer may lie in federalism and the 
separation of powers, and part may lie in the informational constraints 
faced by courts, particularly in the bankruptcy context.  We consider these 
points separately. 
a. Federalism and the Separation of Powers 
Baird and Casey argue that superior courts construe ambiguous 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code narrowly to limit the power of 
bankruptcy judges.162  Although Baird and Casey do not address critical 
vendor orders and roll-ups, these financing terms implicate the scope of 
that power.  Courts could read § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code broadly 
to allow the courts to approve any use of the debtor’s assets.  However, 
this would raise separation of powers and federalism concerns.  It would 
raise separation of powers concerns because Congress set forth priority 
                                                          
 161.   See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2012). 
 162.   See Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero, 2012 S. CT. REV. 203, 
205 (2013). 
 
2018 INEQUITY AND EQUITY OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 911 
rules.  Some of these priority rules require pro rata distributions of 
similarly situated creditors in Chapter 7163 and an absence of unfair 
discrimination in Chapter 11.164  In addition, Jevic reminds us that 
deviations can also undermine the priority that Congress has granted to 
some creditors over those who would be favored by judicially sanctioned 
deviations.165  Separation of power considerations, Baird and Casey 
conclude, partly explain why bankruptcy courts understand that Code 
priorities limit their powers. 
Baird and Casey’s argument accurately describes the understanding 
superior courts have of their own powers.  But it can justify that 
understanding too.  The basic normative concern is that courts lack the 
authority to deviate from statutory priority rules, even when deviations 
increase net welfare.  Federal judges, who are unelected, lack lawmaking 
power.  Only Congress, not the courts, has the authority to permit welfare-
enhancing deviations.  It is one thing for Congress to override property 
rights created by state and nonbankruptcy federal law, and authorize 
bankruptcy courts in prescribed circumstances to monetize them or 
diminish their value.  It is quite another for courts to do the same without 
Congressional authorization, even when the priority override is welfare-
enhancing.  This is a political objection to the judicial use of the Kaldor-
Hicks standard in bankruptcy. 
b. Information and Agency Problems 
The doctrines discussed above would raise less significant separation 
of powers concerns if Congress explicitly granted bankruptcy courts or the 
debtor the authority to determine distributional priorities.  In a world of 
omniscient judges, a rule based on Kaldor-Hicks improvements would 
maximize the value of the estate.  However, in a world of omniscient 
judges, there would be little need for rules of private property; judges 
could simply determine the best use of all assets.  In reality, judges are not 
omniscient and must rely on the parties for their information.  This 
problem can be especially acute in bankruptcy, as the judge may hear from 
only one side of the dispute or be supplied with limited information 
relevant to his decision.  Other parties in interest may not be sufficiently 
organized or, if organized, unable to present relevant information to the 
court.  In either case the court might have limited and possibly inaccurate 
information on which to base its decision. 
                                                          
 163.   See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2012). 
 164.   Id. § 1129. 
 165.   See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 986–87 (2017). 
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When protecting a property interest, a Pareto standard may impose a 
less severe informational demand on judges.  For example, a rule that 
awards a tort victim or a contractual counter-party damages creates a form 
of Pareto standard.  A court need only ensure that the tort victim is made 
no worse off by the tort or the counter-party is made no worse off by the 
breach.  The tortfeasor and breaching parties can then decide their best 
course of action in light of the damages they must pay. 
Bankruptcy may reduce the value of a secured claim to the value of 
the collateral,166 but once this is done, the secured claim is entitled to full 
repayment and is not entitled to any further payment.167  Therefore, courts 
need only ensure that the Debtor has taken sufficient steps to protect the 
secured creditor against a decline in the value of the property, and the court 
need not estimate the likelihood of a successful reorganization. 
The same may not true of the priority rules because general claims and 
claims who enjoy statutory priority are likely entitled to some of the 
reorganization surplus.  In the simple case where there is a priority creditor 
who would be paid in full in the event of a liquidation, the court could 
conduct a similar analysis, refusing to approve a deviation unless the full 
repayment of the priority creditor is adequately protected.  However, in 
order to determine whether the disfavored creditors are at least as well off 
as they would be without the proposed deviation, a court must determine 
the expected value of their repayment.  The court is not simply trying to 
ensure that the disfavored creditors are guaranteed to receive at least as 
much as they would have in a liquidation.  As discussed above in Part B, 
this actually imposes a greater informational burden on the court: it must 
estimate both the firm’s going concern value relative to its liquidation 
value and the probability that the firm could achieve this going concern 
value if the deviation did not occur. 
Perhaps there is something more basic at work.  Although Chapter 11 
exists because markets are imperfect, courts are imperfect too.  A rule that 
requires consent when a deviation is not a Pareto improvement merely 
requires negotiation in the tough cases.  A bankruptcy court is unlikely to 
have reliable information about gains and losses early in the bankruptcy 
case when it might be called on to grant a critical vendor motion.  Because 
they are made at the end of the case, the court may have better information 
about the consequences of other decisions such as whether to approve a 
plan of reorganization that includes substantive consolidation or that 
provides differential payments as between co-equal classes.  However, 
                                                          
 166.   See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012). 
 167.   Note, however, the creditor is given an unsecured claim for the remainder of her original 
claim and may be entitled to some recovery on that claim. 
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creditors arguably have better information at that point and are positioned 
to use it to bargain over the distribution of estate assets.  A comparison 
between the court and the creditors with respect to the amount and quality 
of information about gains and losses does not favor the court. 
Unlike the court, the bankrupt firm’s managers may have very good 
information about the possible gains and losses from the various options.  
However, often they will not be impartial.  Most reorganizing firms are 
small,168 and the managers and the equity holders are the same.  This 
creates an obvious conflict of interest.  Even in the largest bankruptcies, 
one can question how disinterested the managers really are.169  In the 
nonbankruptcy context, corporate law departs from the strong form of the 
business judgment rule in the mergers and acquisitions context because 
managers may be too reluctant to sell the firm if they would lose 
employment or too eager to sell if they receive a bonus from the acquirer 
or some other reward.170  Similarly, managers of bankrupt firms may be 
too reluctant to liquidate or sell the firm or too eager to sell the firm.  In 
fact, the problem may actually be worse in bankruptcy.  Outside 
bankruptcy the various stakeholders can use contract to mitigate these 
problems.  However, inside bankruptcy, courts will ignore these 
contractual restrictions.171  Freed of the restrictions, managers can make 
asset allocation decisions to favor one set of claimants over others.  They 
therefore cannot be counted on to make financing decisions that maximize 
asset value, rather than acting to benefit specific stakeholders at the 
expense of others.  In these circumstances the debtor-in-possession’s 
decisions are not entitled to a presumption of reasonableness.  For this 
reason, the bankruptcy court cannot completely defer to the managers’ 
decisions in determining whether their choices meet the Kaldor-Hicks test. 
As a practical matter, courts may have to offer some deference to the 
managers’ decisions because of the managers’ better access to 
information.  For example, bankruptcy courts will authorize the debtor-in- 
possession’s decision to assume or reject executory contracts and 
                                                          
 168.   Note that excluding Chapter 11 cases with less than $1,000,000 in assets reduced the sample 
size by more than half.  See supra notes 92–93, and the accompanying text.  
 169.   Cf. Otte v. Mfgs. Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092, 1098 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (“The debtor in possession is hardly neutral [with respect to the proposed cross-
collateralization].”)  
 170.   See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
 171.   See, e.g., Steffan v. McMillan (In re Coordinated Fin. Planning Corp.), 65 B.R. 711, 714 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a restrictive covenant, as an executory contract, can be rejected 
by trustee); In re Am. Trailer & Storage, Inc., 419 B.R. 412, 441 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009) (holding 
that modification of financial convenant permissible if modification does not inter alia “unduly harm” 
secured creditor’s collateral position). 
 
914 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
unexpired leases or sell estate assets if made in good faith and on the basis 
of a reasonable business judgment.172  This is a deferential standard of 
review, comparable in content to the business judgment rule in corporate 
law.173 
The business judgment rule gives the debtor-in-possession a lot of 
discretion.  But this is true regardless of the standard the debtor-in- 
possession is to use to make financing decisions.  This is because the 
judicial standard for reviewing these decisions is distinct from the duty 
bankruptcy law might impose on the debtor-in-possession in making the 
decisions.  As a result, the business judgment rule is compatible with the 
debtor-in-possession making financing decisions based on a Kaldor-Hicks 
standard, a Pareto standard or any other standard.  The standard of review 
therefore does not determine the standard governing the debtor-in- 
possession’s choices. 
A deferential standard such as the business judgment rule presumes 
that the debtor-in-possession’s decisions accord with its duties.  Reversal 
of its decisions requires substantial proof that the debtor-in-possession 
violated its obligations.  The choice of standard governing the debtor-in-
                                                          
 172.   See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Dist. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 40 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985); In re 
Lionel, 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (authorizing the decision to sell the majority of estate 
assets).   
 173.   See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.02[2] (16th ed. 2017); Jesse Fried, Executory 
Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46 DUKE L. J. 517, 539 (1996); cf. In re 
Farmland Indus., Inc., 294 B.R. 855, 881 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003).  Executory contracts present yet 
another context in which many courts have rejected a Kaldor-Hicks test in favor of something that 
looks a little like a Pareto test.  Some courts adopt a “balancing test” and refuse to allow a debtor to 
reject an executory contract if the damage to the counter-party would be disproportionately larger than 
the benefit to the estate.  See Fried, supra, at 542–44.  This balancing test is obviously based on a 
Kaldor-Hicks standard.  However, most courts apply a “burdensome test” that allows a debtor to reject 
contracts if performance reduces the value of the estate.  Id. at 540–42.  If we ignore the possibility 
that the debtor could renegotiate with the counter-party after rejection, a burdensome test is quite 
similar to a Pareto test that asks whether the estate would be at least as well off through assumption, 
but it is not precisely the same.  To see this, assume that the debtor has an executory contract with E.  
The debtor owes $50 for goods already delivered under an executory contract and that the contract 
calls for the debtor to pay $150 for new goods to be delivered under the contract and it would cost the 
counter-party $100 to produce these goods.  The debtor also owes $900 to general creditors.  A Kaldor-
Hicks test would instruct the debtor to assume the contract as long as the value of the goods to the 
debtor exceeds cost of performance, $100.  Note that the amount of the existing debt to the counter-
party and the contract price are irrelevant under a Kaldor-Hicks test because their effects are purely 
distributional.  A rule that instructs the manager to maximize the value of the estate would have the 
manager reject the contract as long as the value of the goods to the debtor was less than the sum of the 
outstanding debt and the price of the goods, $200 because the debtor must pay $50 to cure the default 
and then pay the $150 purchase price to obtain the goods.  By contrast, a Pareto test would have the 
manager reject the contract only if the value of the goods was less than $180.  The reason that the 
Pareto test would actually make the debtor more willing to assume contracts than the burdensome test 
is that some portion of the funds used to pay the counter-party for the goods would have flowed to the 
counter-party upon rejection to satisfy its claim. 
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possession’s decisions, therefore, matters if it is biased.  For example, if 
the debtor-in-possession is too likely to assume executory contracts, a 
Pareto rule may be preferable, as it makes assumption more difficult.  This 
is because a Pareto rule allows assumption of the contract only if its 
performance does not diminish the value of the claims of any creditor.  
Accordingly, a creditor can prevent assumption by demonstrating that 
assumption will diminish the value of its claim, even when assumption is 
a net benefit to the estate.  Although a Pareto rule prevents assumption of 
these contracts, it also prevents a debtor-in-possession biased in favor of 
assumption to assume contracts that are not net beneficial contracts and 
assures that the contracts that are assumed are a net benefit to the estate.  
Consider an analogy.  Assume that a legislature wants cars to travel at 
fifty-five miles per hour.  Assume also that it knows that drivers routinely 
drive ten miles an hour above the speed limit because the police have 
difficulty proving guilt when the difference between the posted speed and 
the actual speed is less than ten miles an hour.  Rather than simply posting 
a speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour and accepting traffic at sixty-five 
miles per hour, the town can post a speed limit of forty-five miles an hour 
and have its desired traffic speed of fifty-five.174 
A Pareto test is not the exclusive means of adjusting for the effects of 
deference given to possibly biased managers.  One can also adapt a 
Kaldor-Hicks test to demand that the debtor show that the gains from 
departing from the ordinary entitlements substantially outweigh the harms.  
This is, in fact, what courts do when they adopt a variant of a Kaldor-Hicks 
test.  Consider, for example, the D.C. Circuit’s announced test for 
substantive consolidation.  Rather than adopt a pure Kaldor-Hicks test, the 
D.C. Circuit insists that “the demonstrated benefits of consolidation 
‘heavily’ outweigh the harm.”175 
Thus, the central question is whether the debtor-in-possession is likely 
to be biased in its financing decisions.  As noted above, the debtor-in-
possession tends not to be impartial in a significant number of 
reorganizations.  It tends to make financing decisions that help itself or 
creditors with whom it has a relationship at the expense of other creditors.  
This bias argues for these decisions to be subject to a Pareto rule, even 
where the business judgment rule is the operative judicial standard of 
review. 
                                                          
 174.   Michael D. Gilbert, Insincere Rules, 101 VA. L. REV. 2185, 2185–86 (2015). 
 175.   In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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2. Distributional Considerations Matter 
A rule based on Kaldor-Hicks improvements ignores distributional 
considerations.  This is because the Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not 
require that the losers be compensated, and the failure to compensate 
affects distribution.  Distribution in turn can matter.  The point was not 
lost on either Kaldor or Hicks when they separately formulated what is 
now known as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  In stating this standard of 
efficiency, both noted that actual compensation was a separate question.176  
The observation acknowledges that the actual compensation of losers 
might be important for moral and other reasons.  The Kaldor-Hicks 
standard, therefore, is at most only a necessary condition of social 
optimality.  Distributional considerations can remain important for at least 
three reasons.  First, fairness might require that the losers actually be 
compensated for their loss.  Second, distribution may affect ex ante 
incentives.  Third, distributional considerations matter because they create 
an incentive for rent-seeking. 
David Skeel suggests that giving the debtor discretion whom to pay 
can benefit more vulnerable creditors.177  As an example, he cites the 
Detroit bankruptcy in which retirees recovered at a much higher rate than 
bondholders.178  However, even if one assumes that equity would give 
retirees more than bondholders, his example is not nearly as powerful as 
he assumes.  All of the classes with bondholders consented to Detroit’s 
plan of reorganization,179 and even the most ardent proponents of equality 
would allow deviations with consent.  The real deviation from equality in 
Detroit’s bankruptcy occurred with respect to classes comprised in part by 
involuntary creditors such as tort claimants, when Judge Rhodes overruled 
their unfair discrimination objection.180  It is far less clear that equitable 
(or efficiency) considerations demand that the retirees, represented by a 
union that bargained for their pensions and could have bargained for 
                                                          
 176.   See supra note 115.  
 177.   See Skeel, supra note 1, at 723 (“[Deviations] sometimes favor more vulnerable creditors, 
such as pension beneficiaries”); David A. Skeel Jr., Can Pensions be Restructured in (Detroit’s) 
Municipal Bankruptcy? 1, 25 (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship Paper No. 508, 2013), 
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increased amounts to be set aside to pay for the pensions, receive more 
than involuntary creditors. 
The details of Skeel’s example aside, giving the debtor discretion to 
discriminate in favor of particular creditors based on equitable 
considerations is troublesome.  For one thing, the exercise requires a 
fairness standard that is elusive.  Is it fair that retirees receive a greater 
distribution from the debtor’s estate than tort creditors generally?  Does 
fairness allow the greater distribution when a retiree has a certain level of 
wealth?  With respect to the facts, what makes it fair that one class of 
claimants receive more than another class with claims of the same legal 
nature?  Whether particular facts are relevant to the fairness of a 
distribution depends on the content of the standard of fairness.  That 
standard is unlikely to support favorable treatment of an entire class of 
claimants, dependent as it might be on the circumstances of particular class 
members.181  A related point is that courts might lack the information 
required to apply a compelling standard of fairness. 
An obvious problem in leaving the distribution of assets up to the 
debtor and the courts is that creditors will spend considerable resources 
trying to convince both that they are worthy of extra payment.  The 
reallocation of the debtor’s going concern value and litigation costs 
incurred to do so are unproductive.  Allowing the debtor’s Chapter 11 
reorganization plan to equitably distribute assets by ignoring Code 
priorities encourages wasteful expenditures.182 
Finally, the distribution of assets matters for ex ante incentives.  
Above we noted that Skeel calls for debtors and courts to maximize the 
value of the estate (the aggregate recovery of all creditors) rather than to 
maximize the social value of the firm.183  Not all bankruptcy scholars agree 
with this prescription.  For example, Elizabeth Warren has argued that the 
debtor and bankruptcy courts should not confine themselves to the 
interests of creditors and shareholders, but should also consider the 
interests of other stakeholders such as workers and the broader 
community.184  If one is willing to abandon the exclusive concern with the 
entitlements of creditors, why not abandon entitlements altogether and 
consider the interests of creditors and other stakeholders equally?  An 
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 184.   Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777, 786 (1987).  For a 
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obvious answer is that such a rule would dissuade creditors from lending 
in the first instance. 
The more a creditor will recover, the more credit it is willing to extend 
and the longer it will wait before trying to collect.  Distribution rules in 
bankruptcy are implicit terms of the credit agreement between the debtor 
and its creditor.  The judicial alteration of these rules encourages creditors 
to extend less credit or to impose credit terms more protective to it and 
possibly disadvantageous to the debtor.  Although the alteration may 
permit value-maximizing uses of assets in bankruptcy in some cases, the 
dilution of these rules can produce inefficient ex ante incentives to supply 
the debtor with credit.  The inevitable tradeoff between ex post and ex ante 
incentives does not systematically favor a judicial alteration of distribution 
rules.185 
The point just made assumes that the debt agreement between the 
creditor and debt is socially optimal.  In obtaining credit initially, the 
debtor will structure its loan agreement, taking into account its present 
financing needs against those it might have in the future.  However, the 
parties may not take into account interests other than their own, and the 
agreement therefore sometimes may not be socially optimal.  In these 
cases, Congress intervenes to enact socially optimal priority rules.  For 
example, it might wish to put the IRS ahead of other creditors.  The judicial 
alteration of bankruptcy’s distributional rules undermines these policy 
choices. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the familiar maxim, equity in bankruptcy is not equality.  
There are too many instances in which the law of bankruptcy 
reorganization, both statutory and decisional, enforces priorities among 
creditors and gives a preference to certain creditors over others.  Equity is 
equality only in the purely formal sense that like claims are treated alike.  
Because equity in bankruptcy allows and sometimes requires inequality, 
the question arises as to the standards bankruptcy courts rely on in 
permitting unequal distributions.  If equity in bankruptcy is not equality, 
when does it permit or require inequality in a Chapter 11 reorganization? 
The Pareto standard reflected in a range of doctrines allowing 
deviations from equality has a defensible place in bankruptcy law.  By 
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assuring disfavored creditors a distribution at equal to what they would 
receive without the deviation, the standard eliminates their incentive to 
take inefficient precautions ex ante to avoid a lesser return in bankruptcy.  
The criterion also protects their legal entitlements or the monetary 
equivalent of them.  True, allocations permitted by the Pareto criterion 
themselves may be morally objectionable, as the criterion allows 
unjustified inequality.186  Judged by a moral standard of fairness, deviation 
from the Bankruptcy Code’s distribution rules in a way that violates the 
Pareto test might fairly favor a creditor or more closely approximate a fair 
distribution.  But there is little reason to believe that the Code’s 
distribution rules systematically violate or vindicate  creditors’ moral 
entitlements, or that bankruptcy courts deviating from these rules will 
track morally fair entitlements reliably.  Although the Pareto criterion is 
not a plausible criterion of social optimality, it is a defensible one in 
bankruptcy reorganizations. 
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